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LEE ANNE FENNELL AND
EDUARDO M. PEÑ ALVER

EXACTIONS CREEP

Imagine you are a Supreme Court Justice who cares deeply about
property rights. You worry that landowners are too easily exploited
by governmental entities, and you believe that the Constitution
must protect their prerogatives as owners. You recognize, however,
that a panoply of zoning restrictions, building codes, and other laws
and ordinances often preserve and enhance the value and security
of landownership. The idea that property must be both protected
from state power and with state power resonates with you, but it
presents a doctrinal challenge. How can the Constitution protect
landowners from the government without disabling the machinery
that protects ownership itself? The Supreme Court’s exactions jurisprudence can be understood as an attempt to confront this chalLee Anne Fennell is Max Pam Professor of Law and Herbert and Marjorie Fried Research Scholar, University of Chicago Law School. Eduardo M. Peñalver is John P. Wilson
Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
Authors’ note: During Lee Anne Fennell’s tenure as associate counsel at the State and
Local Legal Center, she worked on an amicus brief ﬁled in Dolan v City of Tigard on behalf
of the National Association of Counties et al. Her academic work on the topic of exactions
began several years later and has always reﬂected only her own views. She is grateful to
the Stuart C. and JoAnn Nathan Faculty Fund for ﬁnancial support. Eduardo M. Peñalver
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lenge.1 The Court has sought to subject some local land use actions
to heightened scrutiny as a matter of federal constitutional law2
while leaving the superstructure of zoning, permitting, and taxation
in place.3 The difﬁculties with this approach became apparent in
Koontz v St. Johns River Water Management District.4 That the Supreme Court has failed in this difﬁcult balancing act is no surprise.
How it has failed, and why it may continue to fail, is an interesting
question and the impetus for this article.
The Court’s exactions jurisprudence, set forth in Nollan v California Coastal Commission,5 Dolan v City of Tigard,6 and now Koontz,
requires the government to satisfy demanding criteria for certain
bargains—or proposed bargains—implicating the use of land. But
the Court has left the domain of this heightened scrutiny wholly
undeﬁned. Indeed, the Koontz majority eschewed any boundary
principle that would hive off its exactions jurisprudence from its
land use jurisprudence more generally. By beating back one form
of exactions creep—the possibility that local governments will circumvent a too narrowly drawn circle of heightened scrutiny—the
Court has left land use regulation vulnerable to the creeping expansion of heightened scrutiny under the auspices of its exactions
jurisprudence.
At ﬁrst blush, the fact that exactions always involve actual or
proposed land use “bargains” might seem to mark out a clear and
well-deﬁned arena for heightened scrutiny. But in fact, virtually
1
We do not mean to suggest that all or even any of the Justices would frame the
enterprise in quite this way, only that the pattern of decided cases reﬂects a struggle
prompted by these competing goals.
2
The Court has grounded this selectively intensiﬁed scrutiny in the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine—a foundation that is notoriously unstable. See notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
3
Even if most of the garden-variety land use regulations and taxes falling into this latter
category could ultimately survive heightened scrutiny, the exercise of applying such scrutiny would be undesirably costly for both courts and local governments.
4
133 S Ct 2586 (2013). In the short time since the decision, Koontz has generated
numerous and varied academic responses, some of which we engage in more detail below.
Papers forthcoming or under development include, for example, Steven J. Eagle, Koontz
in the Mansion and the Gatehouse, 61 Urban Lawyer (forthcoming 2014), online at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_idp2354617; John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The
Very Worst Takings Decision Ever? (Vermont Law School Research Paper No 28-13, Dec
2013), online at http://ssrn.com/abstractp2316406; Mark Fenster, Substantive Due Process
by Another Name: Koontz, Exactions, and the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, Touro L Rev (forthcoming 2014) (on ﬁle with authors).
5

483 US 825 (1987).

6

512 US 374 (1994).
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every restriction, fee, or tax associated with the ownership or use
of land can be cast as a bargain.7 To retain its commitment to
heightened scrutiny for a subset (and only a subset) of land use
controls, the Court must construct some stopping point. Ideally, a
boundary principle would be relatively easy to apply and would
track relevant normative considerations reasonably well. In the exactions context, however, markers that can even minimally approximate these criteria are in short supply—and the Court thinned its
options further in Koontz.
The difﬁculty the Court has experienced and will continue to
experience in constructing a logically coherent, administrable, and
normatively appealing way to bound heightened scrutiny should,
we suggest, lead it to rethink its exactions jurisprudence, and especially its grounding in the Takings Clause, rather than in the Due
Process Clause. Choosing an approach going forward requires examining not only the impact of heightened scrutiny on land use
bargains but also the collateral damage that the rule in question
may do to takings law and other constitutional doctrines, including
the broader doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
This article proceeds in six parts. Part I lays out the doctrinal
terrain and shows where the Koontz case ﬁts in. Part II demonstrates
the potential boundlessness of the domain to which heightened
scrutiny applies under the Court’s recently revamped exactions jurisprudence. To maintain land use law as we know it, limits must
be somehow derived or constructed. Part III approaches this question by asking what normative principles might underlie the sort
of skepticism about bargaining reﬂected in exactions jurisprudence.
After considering several possibilities, we suggest that the most
plausible answer is found in rule-of-law concerns implicated by land
use deal making. Part IV tries to divine the limits that the Koontz
majority might have had in mind, given the way that its holdings
intersect with prior doctrine. This sets the stage for Part V, which
considers a series of alternatives that would attempt to reconcile
the Court’s twin interests in restraining governmental power over
property owners and in keeping the gears of ordinary land use
7
The point is not limited to land use law. Virtually all governmental restrictions and
impositions, head taxes aside, can be cast in conditional terms, as they are premised upon
choosing to sell, earn, employ, and so on. See Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining with the
State 11 (Princeton, 1993).
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regulation running in ways that protect the property interests of
those owners. Part VI concludes our analysis.
I. Takings, Due Process, and Exactions
Koontz arose out of a conﬂict between Coy Koontz, a Florida
landowner, and the St. Johns River Water Management District
(“District”), a regional water authority. Koontz had purchased a
14.9-acre tract of land near Orlando in 1972. The land was mostly
wetlands, though it also contained some forested uplands. Florida
law required Koontz to obtain permission from the District before
ﬁlling any wetlands. In 1994, Koontz applied for a permit from the
District to develop the northern 3.7 acres of his parcel, virtually all
of which were wetlands.8 He offered to dedicate a conservation
easement covering the remaining 11 acres. In the past, the District
had required owners seeking permission to ﬁll wetlands to preserve
10 acres of wetland for every acre they ﬁlled.9 In keeping with this
general practice, the District proposed that Koontz either reduce
the size of his development to a single acre (dedicating a conservation easement for the remainder of the property) or, alternatively,
that he develop the 3.7 acres as he proposed, but pay to improve
the drainage on additional, District-owned land.10 The District also
indicated that it was willing to entertain “equivalent” alternative
proposals from Koontz.11
Koontz rejected the District’s proposal, and the District denied
the permit. Rather than go back to the bargaining table, Koontz
ﬁled a lawsuit in state court. He claimed that the conditions for
permit approval contained in the District’s proposal violated the
Takings Clause.12 Among other things, Koontz challenged the District’s suggested swap of development approval for wetlands protection or mitigation as an unlawful “exaction.” This exactions claim
is different from a claim that the permit denial itself took Koontz’s
8

St. Johns River Water Management District v Koontz, 77 S3d 1220, 1224 (Fla 2011).

9

See Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst at *4 (cited in note 4) (citing Brief for Respondent, Koontz v St. Johns Water Management District, No 11-1447, *12 (ﬁled Dec 21,
2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 6694053)).
10
11

Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2593.

Id.
Koontz sued under Fla Stat § 373.617(2), which provides a cause of action for damages
if a state action is “an unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power constituting a
taking without just compensation.”
12
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property. Instead of challenging the regulatory burden that a denial
would impose, Koontz’s exaction theory contested the legality of
the bargain the District was trying to strike. In order to understand
how the mere attempt to bargain with a property owner—without
any property changing hands—might violate the Takings Clause,
we must brieﬂy explore the contours of the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence.
a. takings and due process
In considering whether a regulation of land constitutes a taking
of property requiring just compensation, the Supreme Court usually adheres to the analysis laid out in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v New York City.13 The Penn Central factors include the “economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,” “the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investmentbacked expectations,” and “the character of the governmental action.”14 The focus of this default regulatory takings inquiry, as the
Court made clear in Lingle v Chevron USA, Inc.,15 is the severity
of the burden the regulation imposes on the property owner.16
The unanimous Court in Lingle contrasted this burden-focused
inquiry with a means-ends style inquiry into the rationality of
government regulation. The latter, the Court said, falls within the
province of the Due Process Clause and, in undertaking it, courts
should be highly deferential to the elected branches.17
The Court has carved out from its default Penn Central takings
analysis two per se rules governing discrete categories of regulation. First, in Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the
Court held that a permanent physical invasion of property authorized by the government necessarily constitutes a taking.18 In
13

438 US 104 (1978).

14

Id at 124.
544 US 528 (2005).

15

16
As the Lingle Court explains, “severity of the burden” represents a common thread
running through all of its regulatory takings jurisprudence, one that can be used to test
how closely a given governmental act approximates a physical appropriation, and to assess
the distributive fairness of the imposition. Id at 539; see id at 539– 40, 542– 43.
17
Id at 543– 45. The inquiries serve different purposes as well. A violation of the Due
Process Clause leads to the invalidation of the enactment, whereas a Takings Clause
violation represents an otherwise legitimate governmental act that can be fully validated
by the payment of just compensation. Id at 543.
18

458 US 419, 441 (1982).
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subsequent cases, the Court has characterized the state appropriation of discrete pools of money, such as the interest from a speciﬁc
account, as Loretto-type takings.19
The Court created a second per se regulatory takings rule in
Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council.20 In that case, the Court
held that a regulation is a per se taking (and not subject to the
Penn Central analysis) when it permanently deprives an owner of
all economically viable use of her property—unless the rule does
no more than codify limitations on owners’ rights already built
into “background principles” of state property law, such as nuisance.21 The Loretto and Lucas exceptions to Penn Central are consistent with the Court’s characterization of the takings inquiry in
Lingle: Their focus is on the burden a government action imposes
on owners.
The Court’s takings framework is not a model of clarity or
coherence. It can be (and has been) assailed on normative, logical,
and administrability grounds. We will not delve into those criticisms here, but will instead accept these principles as given for
purposes of addressing one particularly problematic corner of the
doctrinal picture: exactions.
b. enter exactions
Sitting uncomfortably with Lingle’s takings/due-process typology is the Court’s treatment of claims that the government has
conditioned development approval on exactions of constitutionally
protected property rights from the landowner. In Nollan v California Coastal Commission,22 the plaintiffs owned a small beachfront
home in California. They wanted to demolish the existing home
and build a new, larger home on their lot. California law required
them to obtain permission from the Coastal Commission before
they could undertake their project. The Commission refused to
grant the Nollans permission to build unless they would give the
state a lateral easement allowing the public to cross over the por19
See, for example, Brown v Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 US 216, 235 (2003).
Cases ﬁnding the appropriation of interest from speciﬁc accounts to be takings predate
Loretto. See, for example, Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v Beckwith, 449 US 155, 159,
164 (1980) (applying this principle and citing cases).
20

505 US 1003 (1992).

21

Id at 1027–31.

22

483 US 825 (1987).
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tion of their property adjacent to the mean high tide line.23 The
Supreme Court concluded that the exaction was unconstitutional.24 It held that the demanded easement did not share an
“essential nexus” with the goal the Commission would have (legitimately) advanced by simply denying the requested permission
to expand the house.
In Dolan v City of Tigard,25 the Court added to Nollan’s “essential
nexus” inquiry the requirement that the burden of the condition
imposed upon development permission be roughly proportional
to the harm that would be caused by permitting the development
to go forward.26 The plaintiff in Dolan owned a small hardware
store. When she applied for a permit to expand the store and pave
her parking lot, the city conditioned approval of her application
on her dedication of a piece of her property to the city for use as
a ﬂood plain (subject to a recreational easement) and bicycle path.27
The Court conceded the existence of a nexus between the city’s
demands and the impacts of the plaintiff ’s expanded use of her
property on storm-water runoff and trafﬁc. But it nonetheless held
that the city had violated the Takings Clause because it had failed
to establish that its exaction was sufﬁciently proportional to the
impacts the plaintiff’s proposed expansion would cause.28
The “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests established in Nollan and Dolan together produced an inquiry, ostensibly
operating under the Takings Clause, that is noteworthy in two
respects. First, it scrutinizes the ﬁt between means (the condition
imposed by the government) and ends (mitigation of the harm
caused by the proposed development). Importantly, it does not
evaluate the burden imposed on the landowner by the underlying
regulatory regime from which she is seeking relief. This would
appear to place the test in the domain that the Court identiﬁed
23

Id at 827–29.

24

See id at 837– 42.
512 US 374 (1994).

25
26

Id at 391.

27

See id at 379–81, 393–94.

28

See id at 388, 394 –95. The Court left ambiguous whether it is the harm eliminated
by the exaction that must be proportional to the harm the development causes or whether
it is the burden of the exaction (to the landowner) that must be proportional to those
harms.
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in Lingle with the Due Process Clause, not the Takings Clause.29
Second, the exactions inquiry involves a level of scrutiny of the
proffered ends and chosen means that would be highly unusual in
the due process context.30 The court in Dolan speciﬁcally opted
for the “rough proportionality” language in order to make clear
that the inquiry was to be more searching than the usual “rational
basis” review.31 Moreover, it placed the burden of establishing
compliance with the exactions test squarely on the government’s
shoulders, thereby inverting the traditional presumption of constitutionality of properly enacted regulations.32
The Court has characterized its exactions jurisprudence as an
application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.33 That
29
See Lingle, 544 US at 542– 43. This is not to say that the determination that an owner
has been singled out to bear an unfair burden—an inquiry that that Court in Lingle
identiﬁed with the Takings Clause—does not involve any questions of ﬁt. After all, to
determine that a given burden is unfairly placed on a landowner, we need to know something about the reasons why the government has imposed it. A landowner whose use
constitutes the equivalent of a nuisance, for example, might fairly be required to bear
burdens that would not be appropriate for another landowner—a point the Court made
explicit in Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council:

The “total taking” inquiry we require today will ordinarily entail (as the application of state nuisance law ordinarily entails) analysis of, among other things,
the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent private property,
posed by the claimant’s proposed activities, the social value of the claimant’s
activities and their suitability to the locality in question, and the relative ease
with which the alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by the
claimant and the government (or adjacent private landowners) alike.
505 US 1003, 1030–31 (1992) (citations omitted). Similarly, some of the Penn Central
factors arguably reach considerations that relate to matters of ﬁt or that otherwise seem
to sound in due process. See, for example, Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of
Regulatory Takings, 28 Stan Envtl L J 525, 529 (2009); Lee Anne Fennell, Picturing Takings,
88 Notre Dame L Rev 57, 85 & n 87, 88 (2012). Nonetheless, Lingle marks out a basic
division of labor between the clauses based on the dominant inquiry involved in a given
cause of action. The fact that exactions analysis involves no examination of the magnitude
of the initial regulatory burden from which the landowner seeks relief, but rather begins
the inquiry by examining the terms of a proposed exchange involving that burden, would
seem to locate it in the realm of due process by the Court’s own account.
30
Governmental acts directed at social and economic goals receive rational basis review
unless they implicate fundamental rights or involve suspect classiﬁcations. Such review
requires only that the act be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose (see,
for example, Schweiker v Wilson, 450 US 221, 230 (1981)). While a governmental act that
“fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that
it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause,” Lingle, 544 US at 542, the test is a deferential
one that does not put the government to its proof in establishing how well, or even if,
the legislation serves particular goals.
31

512 US at 391.

32

See id at 394 –96; id at 405–11 (Stevens, J, dissenting); id at 413–14 (Souter, J,
dissenting).
33

Dolan, 512 US at 385; Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2594 –95; Lingle, 544 US at 547.
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doctrine limits the ability of the government to condition its grant
of a discretionary beneﬁt to a claimant on the claimant’s waiver
of some constitutional right that the government would not be
entitled simply to override.34 For example, the government cannot
condition its grant of employment—something it is entitled under
normal circumstances to withhold—on an applicant’s waiver of his
First Amendment right to choose his own religion. In the exactions
context, the constitutional right at issue has been located in the
Takings Clause. As the Court put it in Koontz, by conditioning
development approval on the landowner’s conveyance of some
property interest to the government, “the government can pressure an owner into voluntarily giving up property for which the
Fifth Amendment would otherwise require just compensation.”35
c. the scope of scrutiny
Nollan and Dolan sparked two axes of disagreement among the
lower courts about the reach of the exactions doctrine.36 First,
courts split over whether Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny applied
to exactions in which the government demands a cash payment
rather than a dedication of an interest in land in exchange for
development permission.37 Second, they divided over whether the
34

The unconstitutional conditions doctrine has spawned considerable scholarly output.
Inﬂuential treatments include, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining with the State
(1993); Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 Colum L Rev 473 (1991); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv L Rev 1413 (1989); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions:
The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U Pa L Rev 1293 (1984). Despite
the Dolan Court’s characterization of the doctrine as “well-settled,” 512 US at 385, it has
so thoroughly eluded attempts to reduce it to a workable formula that some scholars have
urged abandonment of it altogether. See generally Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional Consistency, 72 Denver U L Rev 989
(1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism
with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech and Abortion, 70 BU L Rev 593 (1990). Theoretical work on the doctrine continues, nonetheless. Notable recent works include, for
example, Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 Va
L Rev 479 (2012); Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions
in Three Dimensions, 90 Georgetown L J 1 (2001).
35

Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2594.

36

Another unresolved issue, addressed in Koontz, was the status of “failed exactions”—
exactions proposed to a landowner but not accepted or implemented. See generally Mark
Fenster, Failed Exactions, 36 Vt L Rev 623 (2012); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions,
26 J Land Use & Envir L 277 (2011).
37
See Ann E. Carlson and Daniel Pollak, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme Court’s
Takings Jurisprudence Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35 UC Davis L Rev 103, 137–38
(2001) (suggesting that Nollan and Dolan may encourage use of impact fees and discourage
physical land exactions); David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened
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exactions doctrine applies only to so-called “ad hoc” or “adjudicated” exactions, that is, exactions whose terms are worked out
on a case-by-case basis in negotiations with landowners. Courts
and commentators usually contrast adjudicative exactions with exactions that are more “legislative” in character.38 A legislative exaction is one in which the state’s conditions on development are
spelled out in advance in a generally applicable formula or schedule.
Before Koontz, the Supreme Court had not intervened to decisively resolve either debate. On at least two occasions, however,
it had used dicta to describe its exactions cases as having involved
ad hoc state demands that owners turn over tangible interests in
land. In City of Monterey v Del Monte Dunes at Monterey Ltd.,39 the
Court deﬁned “exactions” as “land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of property to public
use.”40 Later, in Lingle, the Court suggested that the reach of
Nollan/Dolan scrutiny was limited to “adjudicative land-use exactions,” in which the state demands—in exchange for development
permission—that the property owner hand over an interest in land
that, if imposed directly, “would have been a per se physical taking.”41 This dicta in Lingle appeared to put the Court in the camp
Scrutiny, 75 NC L Rev 1243, 1259–60 (1997) (considering the varying interpretations of
Dolan’s application to monetary exactions); see also Dudek v Umatilla County, 69 P3d 751,
757–58 (Or Ct App 2003) (discussing the split among courts over the question of whether
Dolan applies to monetary exactions). Cases holding that Nollan and Dolan do not apply
to monetary exactions include McClung v City of Sumner, 548 F3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir
2008); Smith v Town of Mendon, 4 NY3d 1, 12 (2004); Home Builders Association v City of
Scottsdale, 930 P2d 993, 999–1000 (Ariz 1997); West Linn Corporate Park, L.L.C. v City of
West Linn, 240 P3d 29, 45– 46 (Or 2010); City of Olympia v Drebick, 126 P3d 802, 808
(Wash 2006). Cases holding that monetary exactions are subject to Nollan/Dolan scrutiny
include Town of Flower Mound v Stafford Estates Ltd Partnership, 135 SW3d 620, 635– 40
(Tex 2004); Home Builders Association of Dayton and the Miami Valley v City of Beavercreek,
89 Ohio St 3d 121, 128 (2000); Ehrlich v City of Culver City, 911 P2d 429, 433 (Cal 1996);
Northern Illinois Home Builders Association v County of DuPage, 165 Ill 2d 25, 32–35 (1995).
38
Cases holding that Nollan and Dolan do not apply to “legislative” exactions include
McClung v City of Sumner, 548 F3d 1219, 1227–28 (9th Cir 2008); St. Clair County Home
Builders Association v City of Pell City, 61 S3d 992, 1007 (Ala 2010); Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Association v DeKalb County, 588 SE2d 694, 697 (Ga 2003); San Remo Hotel v City
and County of San Francisco, 27 Cal 4th 643, 671–72 (2002); Krupp v Breckenridge Sanitation
District, 19 P3d 687, 695–96 (Colo 2001); Curtis v Town of South Tomaston, 708 A2d 657,
659–60 (Me 1998); Parking Association of Ga., Inc. v City of Atlanta, 450 SE2d 200, 203 n
3 (Ga 1994). In Town of Flower Mound, 135 SW3d at 640–42, in contrast, the Texas Supreme
Court applied Nollan and Dolan to a legislative exaction.
39

526 US 687 (1999).

40

Id at 702.

41

544 US at 546.
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of the lower courts that had declined to apply Nollan and Dolan
to so-called “legislative” exactions (exactions that operate according to a predetermined formula or schedule) and on the side of
those lower courts that had declined to apply Nollan and Dolan to
exactions of money.42
d. the koontz decision
In Koontz, the Supreme Court deﬁnitively rejected the notion—
hinted at in Del Monte Dunes and Lingle—that the Nollan/Dolan
test applies only to exactions of physical interests in land. Koontz
had prevailed in the state trial court and intermediate appellate
court on an exactions theory, but the Florida Supreme Court had
reversed, ﬁnding Nollan and Dolan inapplicable based on its interpretation of the scope of the Supreme Court’s exactions doctrine. Relying on the limiting language in Del Monte Dunes and
Lingle, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that Nollan and
Dolan do not apply to exactions of money and, in addition, do not
apply when an agency denies the requested permit (as opposed to
granting the permit subject to certain conditions).43
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected both of these limits on Nollan
and Dolan. All of the Justices agreed that, contrary to the Florida
Supreme Court’s holding, permit denials as well as conditional
permit grants are subject to exactions scrutiny. In the majority’s
words,
[a] contrary rule would be especially untenable . . . because it would
enable the government to evade the limitations of Nollan and Dolan
simply by phrasing its demands for property as conditions precedent
to permit approval. Under the Florida Supreme Court’s approach, a
government order stating that a permit is “approved if” the owner turns
over that property would be subject to Nollan and Dolan, but an identical
order that uses the words “denied until” would not.44

The Justices split over the question whether a demand for
money fell within the boundaries of Nollan and Dolan. The ﬁveJustice majority opinion by Justice Samuel Alito held that the
Court’s exactions jurisprudence reached demands for money. The
42
See McClung, 548 F3d at 1226–28 (relying on Lingle to limit Nollan and Dolan analysis
to adjudicated land use exactions); Wisconsin Builders’ Association v Wisconsin Department of
Transportation, 702 NW2d 433, 446– 48 (Wis App 2005) (same).
43

See St. Johns River Management District v Koontz, 77 S3d 1220, 1230 (Fla 2011).

44

Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2595–96. The dissent agreed. See id at 2603 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
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dissenters, led by Justice Elena Kagan, rejected this position.
In reaching its conclusion, the Koontz majority had to navigate
around the Court’s 1998 decision in Eastern Enterprises v Apfel.45
In Eastern Enterprises, a plurality of the Court had concluded that
retroactively imposing liability on a former coal operator for retired coal miners’ medical beneﬁts violated the Takings Clause.46
However, the four dissenters in Eastern Enterprises, along with
Justice Anthony Kennedy (who concurred in the judgment on due
process grounds), took the position that the Takings Clause did
not apply at all when government imposes general obligations to
pay money.47 As Justice Kennedy put it, “the Government’s imposition of an obligation . . . must relate to a speciﬁc property
interest to implicate the Takings Clause.”48 Kennedy thereby distinguished cases like Brown v Legal Foundation of Washington,49 in
which the government had seized interest earned on speciﬁc accounts.
The concern with applying the Takings Clause to more generalized obligations to pay money was, as Justice Stephen Breyer
noted in his dissenting opinion, the difﬁculty of distinguishing
such obligations from taxes, which have long been understood to
lie beyond takings scrutiny.50 “If the Clause applies when the government simply orders A to pay B,” he asked, “why does it not
apply when the government simply orders A to pay the government, i.e., when it assesses a tax?”51
45

524 US 498 (1998).

46

Signiﬁcantly, the plurality did not conclude that the imposition of retroactive liability
constituted a per se regulatory taking under Loretto or Lucas. Instead, it found a taking
only after applying the multifactor Penn Central analysis. Eastern Enterprises, 524 US at
529–37.
47
Id at 554 –58 (Breyer, J, dissenting); id at 543– 45 (Kennedy, J, concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part).
48

Id at 544 (Kennedy, J, concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).

49

538 US 216 (2003).
Eastern Enterprises, 524 US at 556 (Breyer, J, dissenting). Although Richard Epstein
has famously argued that takings analysis should apply to taxes, this approach has not been
pursued by the judiciary or political branches. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 95 (Harvard, 1985) (casting all regulations, taxes,
and changes in liability rules as “takings of private property prima facie compensable by
the state”); id at 283 (“The proposition that all taxes are subject to scrutiny under the
eminent domain clause receives not a whisper of current support.”); see also Eduardo M.
Peñalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 Colum L Rev 2182, 2185–86 (2004) (“Whatever inﬂuence
Epstein’s theory has had on discussions of takings law generally, few have accepted his
invitation to turn their backs on the unqualiﬁed power to tax.”).
50

51

Eastern Enterprises, 524 US at 556 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
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Courts and commentators alike have read Eastern Enterprises to
mean that general obligations to pay money do not fall within the
ambit of “private property” protected by the Takings Clause.52 In
Koontz, the majority did not reject this reading of Eastern Enterprises—unsurprising, given that Justice Kennedy joined the Koontz
majority. Instead, Justice Alito seized on Justice Kennedy’s speciﬁc
language in Eastern Enterprises to argue that, unlike in Eastern
Enterprises, “the demand for money at issue [in Koontz] did ‘operate
upon . . . an identiﬁed property interest’ by directing the owner
of a particular piece of property to make a monetary payment.”53
As a consequence, the majority argued, “the demand for money
burdened petitioner’s ownership of a speciﬁc parcel of land”54 and
takings scrutiny was appropriate.
II. Exactions Unbound
Having described the relevant legal terrain, let us return
to our hypothetical Supreme Court Justice worried about both
protecting private property rights from government abuse and
safeguarding the ability of government to protect property expectations through tools like zoning law. Applying heightened
means-ends scrutiny to land use regulation across the board would
seem to tip the scales too far in the direction of limiting government power.55 Even if the bulk of existing land use regulation
could survive such scrutiny (a proposition that is by no means
clear), subjecting every decision on zoning, taxation, and permits
in tens of thousands of municipalities across the country to such
searching review would generate prohibitive costs for local gov52
See, for example, Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 Va
L Rev 885, 903– 07 (2000); Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2605–07 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
53
Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2599, quoting Eastern Enterprises v Apfel, 524 US 498, 554 –56
(1998).
54

Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2599.
The Koontz majority presumably shares this view, although the opinion leaves some
room for doubt. After noting the need for exactions jurisprudence to accommodate both
externality control and control of governmental overreaching, Justice Alito suggests that
the Nollan/Dolan test can serve both functions by ensuring that landowners can be required
to cover their own externalities, but nothing more. Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2594 –95. If land
use regulation is only legitimate to the extent that it actually controls quantiﬁable landowner-caused externalities, as this passage almost implies, extending tests of nexus and
proportionality to the whole of land use regulation might seem unproblematic. But that
line of reasoning would ignore the very real costs of applying the scrutiny itself. It would
also be at odds with the Court’s prior pronouncements and analysis, including that in
Euclid (which Justice Alito cites in this very passage).
55
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ernments and courts.56 Such widely applied scrutiny would upend
the established expectations of the very landowners that our Justice
means to protect. And so a doctrine like Nollan/Dolan nexus and
proportionality review must be kept within limits.
At ﬁrst blush, the Court’s exactions jurisprudence seems to occupy a well-bounded territory: Heightened scrutiny only applies
when the government attempts to bargain with a landowner over
the grant of a permit (or some other land use privilege). But this
apparently straightforward means of ﬁrewalling off the domain of
Nollan and Dolan depends on a doubtful proposition: that land use
“bargains” (understood broadly as land use regulations that are
somehow conditional in their application to particular landowners)
can be readily picked out from land use controls more generally.
For several reasons, including some exacerbated by Koontz itself,
deal spotting is not so simple. As a consequence, deﬁning the
Court’s exactions test in terms of bargaining alone risks allowing
the test to slip its bonds and become the basis for wide-ranging
heightened judicial scrutiny of land use regulation generally.
a. the ubiquity of deal making in land use law
Discretionary, conditional, or negotiated applications of land
use laws are not aberrations that stand out against a backdrop of
well-ordered, prospectively announced, and uniformly imposed
land use regulations. Instead, land use control typically proceeds
in a piecemeal fashion.57 Land use deal making frequently takes
the form embodied in the Court’s exactions cases: regulators have
discretion to block a project or permit it to go forward, and they
bargain with the landowner over the terms on which they will
approve the project. As a consequence, the exactions test already
potentially covers a large portion of land use regulation. But even
in the absence of such explicit bargaining, most if not all land use
law can be framed as deal making given that the laws are conditional in nature and subject to frequent and ﬁne-grained revision.58
56

For further discussion of extending heightened scrutiny in this manner, see Part V.D.
See, for example, Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a
Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 Cal L Rev 837, 841 (1983) (describing piecemeal changes
as “the everyday fare of local land regulations”).
57

58
Jurisdictions vary in their approaches to piecemeal changes as well as to the enterprise
(and indeed necessity) of comprehensive land use planning. See text accompanying notes
187, 200–203. Nonetheless, all jurisdictions incorporate some ﬂexibility into their land
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Figure 1. The exaction

To see why the ﬂuid and highly individualized nature of land
use regulation makes it difﬁcult to isolate the phenomenon of
bargaining, consider Figure 1’s stylized depiction of an exaction.
At its essence, an exaction pairs some desired land use beneﬁt with
some land use burden. We will defer for the moment the question
of which burdens are sufﬁcient to trigger scrutiny as an exaction,
and assume that the burden depicted is of this nature.
An exaction, as envisioned by Nollan and Dolan, offers a bundled
choice to a landowner. Option 1 in Figure 1 represents the status
quo land use package, which includes beneﬁts B and burdens C.
In the prototypical exaction, the state offers the landowner the
paired set of beneﬁt A and burden D, which when added to the
existing land use package comprises Option 2. For a concrete
example, consider the facts in Nollan. The Nollans began with a
land use package that gave them certain rights (B), including the
right to maintain and use the existing residential structure on their
beachfront property. This package also came with certain burdens
(C), such as complying with zoning and building codes, not creating a nuisance, paying property taxes, and so on. The Nollans
use control regimes, and hence afford some degree of discretion to local decision-making
bodies.
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wished to tear down the existing cottage and build a larger home
on the property. The right to do this was not part of their initial
land use package. The government offered this beneﬁt (A) to them,
but it coupled it with a new burden (D), which consisted of granting an easement allowing the public to cross their property. Thus,
the Nollans were given a choice between Option 1 and Option 2.
This choice set was identiﬁed as an exaction, subjected to
heightened means-ends scrutiny, and deemed constitutionally impermissible due to the lack of a logical nexus between the grant
of A and the imposition of D. The impacts of building a larger
house on private land, the Court reasoned, were completely unrelated to the government’s stated interest in safeguarding public
beach access.59 In Dolan, the Court deemed a similar choice set—
between forgoing the right to expand a hardware business and
granting land of the public for a bike path and greenway—impermissible due to the lack of rough proportionality between the
impact of expanding the store and the value of the property interests demanded by the state.60 In both cases, the Court assumed
for the sake of argument that the government had no duty to
supply beneﬁt A at all, but could instead leave the landowners with
Option 1, their initial mix of burdens and beneﬁts.61 What the
Court held that the government could not constitutionally do was
condition the grant of beneﬁt A on the concession of burden D—
unless the deal passed the tests of nexus and rough proportionality.
Suppose, however, there were no other burden of interest to
the government that would meet the Nollan and Dolan tests—or
that the government did not want to bear the high cost of proving
that it was in compliance with those tests. In that case, the government would be put to the following choice: leave the landowner
with Option 1 or provide an alternative (Option 3) in which it
simply grants beneﬁt A without any additional burden. This is
shown in Figure 2.
59
60

Nollan, 483 US at 837–38.

See Dolan, 512 US at 392–96.
See Nollan, 438 US at 835–36 (assuming without deciding that preventing blockage
of the beach is a legitimate public purpose, “in which case the Commission unquestionably
would be able to deny the Nollans their permit outright if their new house . . . would
substantially impede these purposes, unless the denial would interfere so drastically with
the Nollans’ use of their property as to constitute a taking.”); Dolan, 512 US at 387
(“Undoubtedly, the prevention of ﬂooding along Fanno Creek and the reduction of trafﬁc
congestion in the Central Business District qualify as the type of legitimate public purposes
we have upheld”).
61
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Figure 2. The government’s choice set sans exaction

Why might the government choose Option 3 over Option 1?
It would do so if it actually expected the additional development
allowed by granting the landowner beneﬁt A to be valuable on
net for the community (due, say, to an enriched property tax base,
new local employment opportunities, or otherwise).62 Of course,
there are also plenty of reasons a local government might just stick
with Option 1—even if both it and the landowner would prefer
the now unavailable Option 2.63
b. hidden bargains
Already, we can see how the category of exactions threatens to
62
See Epstein, Bargaining at 183 (cited in note 7) (referencing the “empirical guess” in
the Nollan situation that the government will choose not to deny the permit outright,
since doing so “necessarily deprives the community of the increased taxes generated by a
new residence which probably will not increase the demands on public facilities by the
same amount”).
63
A number of scholars have focused on the possibility that restrictions on exactions
will block efﬁcient bargains. See, for example, Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 Cal L Rev 609, 661–65 (2004);
Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 Iowa L
Rev 1, 28–33 (2000); William A. Fischel, The Economics of Land Use Exactions: A Property
Rights Analysis, 50 L & Contemp Probs 101, 104 –06 (1987).
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swallow a large proportion of land use control.64 But the problem
of unboundedness goes even deeper than the discussion to this
point might suggest: How can we be sure that Option 1 is not
itself a constitutionally improper bargain? If Option 1 is the starting point for negotiations, it might seem like it cannot possibly
constitute a bargain itself. But Option 1 is never the only choice.
This is so for three reasons: (1) the possibility that past bargains
produced the law as presently incarnated in Option 1, (2) the
existence of as-yet-unchosen options and trade-offs intentionally
built into Option 1 (embedded bargains), and (3) the pervasive
possibility that the existing law can be changed in the future (hypothetical bargains).
1. Past bargains. Option 1 is just one of many forms into which
the law might have crafted the mix of beneﬁts and burdens of
landownership in a particular jurisdiction. It is possible, and indeed
likely, that the law reached its present form only after lawmakers
engaged in a great deal of bargaining with affected landowners,
bundling burdens with beneﬁts in ways that look very much like
the paradigmatic exaction shown in Figure 1. For example, Lynne
Sagalyn describes how, in the 1980s, New York City consulted
with private developers, civic groups, and nonproﬁt foundations
as it attempted to facilitate the redevelopment of Times Square.65
As Sagalyn put it, “the political problem of rebuilding West 42nd
Street involved an extraordinarily delicate act of balancing the city
and state’s aggressive plan for large-scale ground-up development
. . . with its other goals for preserving the historic midblock theaters and their symbolic sense of place . . . while accommodating
the intense community and business concerns of Clinton and the
Garment District. . . .”66 To be sure, these negotiations—and the
kinds of changes in New York’s zoning laws that grew out of
them—happened at some point in the past. But this would not
necessarily put them beyond the reach of constitutional scrutiny.
64
Not all governmental actions that count as exactions must necessarily be subjected
to heightened scrutiny. It may be possible to identify some characteristic of the burden
in question, or some distinguishing feature of the way in which the burden and beneﬁt
are paired or presented to the landowner, that pares down the category that will receive
Nollan/Dolan review, even if the term “exactions” sweeps more broadly. See Parts III and
IV.
65

Lynne B. Sagalyn, Times Square Roulette: Remaking the City Icon 91–102 (MIT, 2001).

66

Id at 101.
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The Court held in Palazzolo v Rhode Island 67 that the mere fact
that a law was enacted in the past does not prevent a landowner
from challenging it as a taking. As Justice Kennedy put it in his
opinion for the Palazzolo Court, some “enactments are unreasonable and do not become less so through the passage of time or
title.”68 It is not obvious why similar logic would not apply to past
bargains between landowners and the state that violated the requirements of Nollan and Dolan.
2. Embedded bargains. In addition, some versions of Option 1
will include what we might call “embedded bargains”—as yet unrealized bargains between the state and the landowner built into
the very structure of the law. For instance, a “ﬂoor area ratio”
(FAR) that is used to regulate building bulk invites landowners to
make a kind of trade-off. Unlike traditional setbacks and height
limits, ﬂoor area ratios control bulk by limiting the total internal
square footage of a structure as compared with the square footage
of the parcel as a whole. For example, if someone owns a 10,000square-foot lot, assigning that lot a FAR of 0.5 means that the
owner can build a 5,000-square-foot structure on the lot. How
she uses that 5,000 square feet is up to her (within whatever other
limits the state imposes). Thus, she could comply with the FAR
by building a structure with a single ﬂoor of 5,000 square feet,
with two ﬂoors of 2,500 square feet each, three ﬂoors of 1,667
square feet, and so on. In effect, the law constitutes an offer to
the owner to trade the beneﬁt of greater height for the burden
of preserving more open space around the building, or the beneﬁt
of smaller setbacks for the burden of lower height.
Conditional use permits are another example of this kind of
built-in bargain. Conditional uses are presumptively permissible
under a zoning law provided that the landowner complies with
the conditions speciﬁed in the zoning law. For example, the zoning
code might permit a day-care business in a residential district if
the owner (1) keeps off-street parking to the rear of the building,
(2) operates only during certain hours, (3) installs a landscaping
buffer between her business and neighboring owners, etc. Socalled “incentive zoning,” in which landowners obtain permission
to exceed zoning limits in exchange for providing various public
67

533 US 606 (2001).

68

Id at 627.
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goods (such as low-income housing or public space), similarly
embeds bargains, but allows a broader divergence between the
impacts of the landowner’s development and the speciﬁed conditions.69
In these examples, the state’s position on the terms of any bargain is spelled out in advance and available to all on the same
basis. Thus, the law embeds a take-it-or-leave-it offer, not an invitation to haggle.70 For instance, depending on the level of speciﬁcity of the conditions, obtaining a permit to engage in a conditional use can be a fairly ministerial act without any interaction
with the state that we might characterize as bargaining. However,
land use ordinances can also embed conditional elements that leave
signiﬁcant discretion to local governmental actors, whether explicitly or through the use of open-textured terms subject to ofﬁcial interpretation.71
3. Hypothetical bargains. Finally, as we have already observed,
the highly individualized revision of land use law is a pervasive
phenomenon. For any given pattern of land use beneﬁts and burdens (Option 1), there is almost always some other package (call
it Option X) that would be acceptable to the government. This
alternative package, let us suppose, would vary from the existing
law that applies to an owner’s parcel by increments corresponding
to Beneﬁt Y and Burden Z, as shown in Figure 3.
If Beneﬁt Y and Burden Z are actually paired together by the
government and offered to the landowner, the situation is that of
the prototypical exaction. But what if Beneﬁt Y and Burden Z are
simply “in the air,” so to speak? The government may know very
well that the landowner wants Beneﬁt Y, or something like Beneﬁt
Y. Perhaps the landowner has asked for it, or it is the sort of
beneﬁt that anyone in the landowner’s position would want. The
landowner may also be aware that the government would like to
impose Burden Z, or something like Burden Z. Perhaps the landowner looks around and sees other landowners who currently have
69
For an example of incentive zoning, see Barry D. Yatt, Cracking the Codes: An Architect’s
Guide to Building Regulations 154 ( John Wiley, 1998) (describing incentive zoning in Seattle).
70
See Epstein, Bargaining at 11 (cited in note 7) (observing that a wide variety of
government regulations and taxes might be characterized “as take-it-or-leave-it offers that
are extended by the government to all individuals”).
71

See text accompanying note 182.
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Figure 3. Option X

Option X and prefers their situation over her own, and voices a
preference for this alternative.
How much must be said about Option X, and by whom, and
in what way, in order for the situation to amount to “bargaining”
(and therefore potentially an impermissible exaction)? Here it becomes important that, after Koontz, an exaction need not take the
form of an explicit condition placed on permit approval in order
to receive heightened scrutiny and be found unconstitutional. Instead, a demand made prior to a permit denial should, according
to the Court, receive the exact same treatment.72 But when do
ambient discussions about an Option X (of which there may be
innumerable versions) coalesce into a “failed exaction” that receives Nollan/Dolan review?
III. Looking for Normative Foundations
The discussion above establishes only that the domain of
exactions is not self-limiting as a conceptual or practical matter—
not that it cannot be somehow limited. The difﬁculty lies in ﬁnding a coherent way to identify what is in and what is out of the
72

See Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2595–96.
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realm of elevated scrutiny, given the conﬂicting goals of protecting
landowners from the government and protecting them from each
other. A principle for setting the boundaries of heightened scrutiny
should ideally have two features: it should be relatively clear (so
that one can tell at the outset what is included), and it should bear
some relationship to what it is that makes exactions normatively
problematic.73 Trade-offs between the two goals may be necessary;
a less good normative ﬁt may be tolerated to produce a much
more administrable test, or a less tractable test might be selected
if it aligns much better with underlying normative concerns.
In crafting tools to deﬁne the reach of heightened exactions
scrutiny it is helpful to start by asking a question that the Court
in Koontz (and, for that matter, in Nollan and Dolan) largely ignored: what is it that is problematic about exactions in the ﬁrst
place? A land use exaction is, at its heart, a conditional regulation
of land use. But why and how does conditionality raise constitutional worries? The question takes us back to the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions.
a. unconstitutional conditions in land use
In a previous article, one of us identiﬁed three possible problems
with the conditional grant of governmental beneﬁts: (1) “receiving
forbidden goods,” in which the government uses the leverage provided by conditionally applicable laws to obtain legal entitlements
that it is not authorized to receive; (2) “bargaining with the opponent’s chips,” in which the government conﬁscates entitlements
belonging to an individual for the sole purpose of selling them
back to that individual; and (3) “appropriations from third parties,”
in which the government obtains desired beneﬁts by trading away
entitlements belonging to third parties whose interests are not
represented in the negotiation.74
73
These two criteria echo in some measure Frank Michelman’s pairing of “settlement
costs” and “demoralization costs” in his analysis of compensable takings. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv L Rev 1165, 1214 –15 (1967). Just as bright-line rules that mark out
distinctive, easily identiﬁed cases help to limit the costs of settling up over compensable
takings, so too would a clearly articulated boundary around heightened scrutiny reduce
the costs of administering the system. And just as one would wish for the cases identiﬁed
for compensation to track normative concerns like demoralization, so too would one wish
for the region of heightened scrutiny to align with relevant normative criteria.
74
The discussion in this section draws on Fennell, 86 Iowa L Rev at 42–56 (cited in
note 63).
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The ﬁrst problem (receiving forbidden goods) can be illustrated
by a governmentally initiated bargain that would require a person
to change her religion in order to receive government beneﬁts. A
commitment to change one’s religion is not something the government is authorized to receive from any citizen. This problem,
however, is not really implicated by individually negotiated, conditional land use laws. We do not normally think of it as improper
to sell or give property to the government. Indeed, unlike other
contexts in which the unconstitutional conditions doctrine might
apply, the Constitution itself explicitly envisions property rights
as subject to (involuntary) alienation to the state for public use
upon the payment of just compensation.
The second potential problem (bargaining with the opponent’s
chips) is readily illustrated by a gunman who threatens “your
money or your life”—entitlements that both belonged to the victim before the gunman came along. Translated into the land use
context, this concern about illicit appropriations can be more directly addressed by applying a standard takings analysis to the
regulation that keeps the landowner from being able to develop
as of right. The Nollan/Dolan analysis, however, like unconstitutional conditions doctrine generally, typically proceeds on the assumption that the government can lawfully decline to waive the
land use restriction in question.75 If this is so, then there has been
no preliminary grab of entitlements, but rather only a legitimate
governmental act in restricting development. Moreover, even if
there had been an illegitimate conﬁscation of land use rights, nexus
and proportionality review would hardly solve the problem.76
Only the third problem (third-party effects) is arguably addressed by the nexus and proportionality doctrine. In theory, these
limits could ensure that the actual costs of development are properly remediated through connected and commensurate concessions, rather than left to fall on third parties while the government
reaps (or confers on others) unrelated beneﬁts. But this is not the
typical exactions case. Exactions claims under Nollan and Dolan
are brought by regulated landowners, not by neighbors who were
75

See Nollan, 438 US at 835–36.
See, for example, Fennell, 86 Iowa L Rev at 53 (cited in note 63) (observing that the
fact that a misappropriated good can only be swapped for connected and proportionate
beneﬁts does not do anything to address the initial misappropriation).
76
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unrepresented in the negotiations and who object to the bargain
that was struck.77
There is a fourth possibility, which we might understand as
straddling the boundary between the second and third categories:
that conditional regulations are objectionable because of the potential they create for government favoritism or even outright
corruption. The prototypical exaction—the government’s demand
for a payment or other concession from a landowner in exchange
for regulatory relief—is structurally very similar to the prototypical bribe. The key distinction between the two is the end to which
the regulator directs the payment or concession from the landowner. If the regulator directs the payment toward the pursuit of
a legitimate public purpose, demanding it does not amount to
soliciting a bribe. If the regulator directs the demanded payment
to her own (or some favored third party’s) private beneﬁt, then it
becomes “corruption.”78
As with the “bargaining with the opponent’s chips” scenario,
improper government favoritism requires the existence of legal
roadblocks in order to thrive. Roadblocks generate the possibility
for government favoritism and corruption when removing them
is both highly discretionary and privately beneﬁcial.79 And, as with
the “appropriations from third parties” scenario, government favoritism and corruption have harmful effects on disfavored third
77
This presumably follows from the nature of the alleged constitutional violation, which
is premised on some property of the landowner being taken (or proposed to be taken)
without just compensation. A neighbor or other third party would not be able to claim
that speciﬁc constitutional injury. See Fenster, 92 Cal L Rev at 655 n 228 (cited in note
63) (“It is the expropriation of the property owner’s land, not effects on anyone else’s
land, that leads the Court to apply the Takings Clause in Nollan and Dolan.”). However,
neighbors and third parties can and do bring claims that land use bargaining practices,
including incentive and contract zoning, violate other principles of law. See, for example,
Municipal Art Society of New York v City of New York, 522 NYS2d 800, 803–04 (NY Sup
Ct 1987) (striking down incentive zoning plan following challenge from third party, on
the ground it amounted to an improper sale of zoning); Hartnett v Austin, 93 So2d 86,
89–90 (Fla 1956) (allowing a neighboring third party to challenge a zoning amendment
that embedded a collateral contract requirement). See also Fenster, 92 Cal L Rev at 655
n 228 (cited in note 63) (discussing and collecting cites on possible bases for third-party
challenges).
78
See, for example, Susan Rose-Ackerman, ed, International Handbook on the Economics
of Corruption xvii (Edward Elgar, 2006) (“In the most common [corrupt] transaction a
private individual or ﬁrm makes a payment to a public ofﬁcial in return for a beneﬁt.”).
79
See Edward L. Glaeser and Raven E. Saks, Corruption in America, 90 J Pub Econ
1053, 1055 (2006) (“The beneﬁts of corruption come from government actors being able
to allocate resources, including the right to bypass certain regulations, to private individuals.”).
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parties. The two scenarios come together in the following way:
the government places roadblocks in front of landowners that it
fully expects to remove at some price, but the price that it charges
any particular landowner will determine whether that landowner
foots more or less than her share of the costs associated with
development.80 The focus of this objection, however, is not only
on distributive consequences, but also on the nature of the government action.
The structural similarity between exactions and corruption is
the marker of a larger problem, one that exactions may raise even
in the absence of any evidence of government corruption or favoritism. The problem stems from the very ﬂexibility that the
exactions device is designed to create, which may operate in tension with principles of rule of law.
b. rule of law
Theorists working in divergent political and philosophical
traditions have emphasized the importance of the rule of law.81
The most inﬂuential accounts focus on several distinctive features
deemed vital to law’s ability to sustain a society of free and equal
persons. The rule of law fosters freedom by increasing the predictability and intelligibility of the regulatory landscape within
which the citizen operates and by constraining ofﬁcials from exercising unfettered discretion.82 John Rawls argues that the rule
of law “constitute[s] grounds upon which persons can rely on one
another and rightly object when their expectations are not fulﬁlled.
80
The question of what constitutes a party’s proper share is itself subject to debate.
See, for example, Joseph L. Sax, The Property Rights Sweepstakes: Has Anyone Held the
Winning Ticket? 34 Vt L Rev 157, 163–65 (2009) (examining the different fairness intuitions that follow from a resource-allocation rule based on space, rather than time).
81
See, for example, F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 133–61 (Chicago, 1960)
(discussing the ability of the state, under certain conditions, to prevent coercion through
law by creating a “private sphere” for the individual); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 235–
43 (Belknap, 1971) (discussing the rule of law and its connection to equality and individual
autonomy); Richard A. Epstein, Beyond the Rule of Law: Civic Virtue and Constitutional
Structure, 56 Geo Wash L Rev 149, 149–52 (1987) (“There is no question that the rule
of law is a necessary condition for a sane and just society . . . [I]t is a very different
question to ask whether it is sufﬁcient to achieve that result.”); Jeremy Waldron, The Rule
of Law and the Importance of Procedure, in James E. Fleming, ed, NOMOS L: Getting to the
Rule of Law 3, 14 –16 (NYU 2011) (discussing the importance of procedure, particularly
in adjudicative settings, for administering the rule of law).
82
See Scott J. Shapiro, Legality 395–96 (Belknap, 2011); see also Hanoch Dagan, Reconstructing American Legal Realism and Rethinking Private Law Theory ch 9 (Oxford, 2013).
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If the bases of these claims are unsure, so are the boundaries of
men’s liberties.”83 Scott Shapiro summarizes this line of thought
nicely when he says that the rule of law “enables members of the
community to predict ofﬁcial activity and hence to plan their lives
effectively,” and, at the same time, “constrains ofﬁcial behavior
and hence protects citizens from arbitrary and discriminatory actions by ofﬁcials.”84
In addition to asserting its intrinsic connection to equality and
liberty, theorists have posited that adherence to the rule of law
generates a number of consequential beneﬁts. Some have argued,
for example, that excessive disregard of the forms of legality has
a corrosive effect on citizens’ respect for the law and on their
willingness to follow it.85 Others have argued that the rule of law
fosters the kind of stability and predictability necessary for economic development.86
Lon Fuller’s discussion of the “inner morality of law” is typical
in terms of the formal features it identiﬁes as crucial to the rule
of law.87 Fuller identiﬁes eight ways that state action may deviate
from the rule of law. Those are: (1) a failure to generate generally
applicable rules (“generality”), “so that every issue must be decided
on an ad hoc basis”; (2) a failure to publicize the law; (3) excessive
use of retroactive legislation; (4) the use of rules that are not
intelligible; (5) the enactment of rules that contradict one another;
(6) use of rules that are beyond the power of the regulated party
to follow; (7) changing rules too frequently; and (8) permitting “a
failure of congruence between the rules as announced and their
actual administration.”88
83

Rawls, A Theory at 235 (cited in note 81).

84

Shapiro, Legality at 395–96 (cited in note 82).

85

See, for example, Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 39– 40 (Yale, rev ed 1969).

86

See, for example, Kenneth W. Dam, The Law-Growth Nexus: The Rule of Law and
Economic Development, chs 1, 10 (Brookings, 2006).
87
See Fuller, The Morality at 39– 43 (cited in note 85). This is not to suggest that
Fuller’s are the only possible requirements for satisfaction of the requirements of the rule
of law, or that the only requirements are formal (as opposed to substantive). See generally
Paul Gowder, Equal Law in an Unequal World, Iowa L Rev (forthcoming 2014), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_idp2203735 (arguing against a conception of the rule of law as exclusively formal). Jeremy Waldron similarly points out that,
in addition to the formal features Fuller identiﬁes, rule of law is also associated with
procedural principles, such as “[a] right to hear reasons” for a decision, and substantive
principles, such as “[r]espect for private property.” See Waldron, Procedure at 5–7 (cited
in note 81).
88

Fuller, The Morality at 39 (cited in note 85). Fuller’s list is perhaps the best known
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Several of these deviations are present in the exactions context,
particularly where the terms of exactions are not spelled out in
advance or, in other words, where they are negotiated with landowners on a case-by-case basis. To the extent that different developers are offered different deals in exchange for regulatory relief, there is a failure of generality. When the terms on which the
state actor is willing to grant regulatory relief are communicated
to different developers privately, there is a failure of publicity. To
the extent that exactions rely on frequent changes in the applicable
zoning law, there may be excessive instability. And, where developers are frequently offered regulatory relief on an ad hoc basis,
there can be a pervasive failure of congruence between the rules
on the books and way the rules are actually applied.89
Understanding heightened scrutiny for exactions through the
lens of a concern with the rule of law has the virtue of tying the
third-party appropriations threatened by land use regulatory bargains to the landowners most likely to become actual Nollan/Dolan
claimants: relatively inexperienced developers who feel abused by
the land use process.90 Their objection, on this view, is not to land
use regulations as such, but to the degree of regulatory discretion
surrounding land use bargains. Excessive discretion renders the
law opaque to the unsophisticated and permits ofﬁcials to strike
vastly different deals with different landowners, demanding much
less from favored landowners in exchange for the waiver of regulatory burdens.91 This differential treatment smacks of arbitrarof the “laundry lists” of principles generated to capture formal requirements of the rule
of law. See Waldron, Procedure at 5–6 (cited in note 81).
89
There is also a form of retroactivity at work in exactions, insofar as changes in
conditions or requirements deviate from what was required at earlier points, when the
property was purchased or when expectations were formed. To some extent this is an
inherent feature of the need to apply law that is responsive to changing conditions to an
enduring asset; it is not unique to the exactions context. However, the concerns associated
with retroactivity gather added force in the exactions context if the rules for obtaining a
permit can be unexpectedly changed in ways that are known (and indeed designed) to
disadvantage particular parties based on their past conduct (here, investments in land).
90
For a discussion of the types of plaintiffs who have appeared in (and who might be
expected to appear in) exactions cases, see, for example, Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion at
*15–17 (cited in note 4).
91
Note, however, that the facts in Nollan itself do not fully square with this interpretation, insofar as the same lateral easement condition was consistently required of other
landowners along the same stretch of beachfront. See Nollan, 483 US at 829 (observing
that the Commission reported similarly conditioning “43 out of 60 coastal development
permits along the same tract of land”; of the others, “14 had been approved when the
Commission did not have administrative regulations in place allowing imposition of the
condition, and the remaining 3 had not involved shorefront property”).
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iness and can easily shade into favoritism and corruption. Lurking
in the background is the possibility that favored landowners may
have become so for improper reasons. Even when nefarious behavior is absent, the existence of bargaining around the law on
the books may create the impression among outsiders that mischief
is at work.
By imposing the limits of nexus and proportionality in its exactions cases, the Court might be understood as attempting to
structure bargaining between governments and developers in ways
that increase the conformity of that bargaining to the formal requirements of the rule of law. On this account, the exactions criteria impose (admittedly broad) outer limits on the relative disadvantage that favorable land use deals (which are obviously not
going to be challenged by the favored developers) can inﬂict on
disfavored landowners. The exactions test might thereby act as a
crude price cap on the waiver of discretionary land use regulations.92 Arguably, this cap attacks both the corruption problem (by
reducing the value of the bargained-for discretionary override) and
the horizontal equity problem (by limiting the potential gaps in
burdens the state can impose on permit applicants).
This rule-of-law account of the exactions jurisprudence mirrors
discussions of eminent domain’s public use requirement, especially
following Kelo v City of New London.93 Arguments about public use
in the economic redevelopment context have frequently cited the
danger of governmental favoritism toward powerful and well-connected private interests to justify limiting the scope of eminent

92
The “rough proportionality” portion of the test seems most plausibly related to this
equalizing function, but the “essential nexus” requirement could also make regulatory
burdens easier to evaluate by limiting the complexity, reach, and heterogeneity of deal
making in a given context.
93
545 US 469 (2005). In Kelo, a group of property owners challenged New London,
Connecticut’s use of eminent domain as part of an economic redevelopment scheme. See
id at 473–76. The property owners argued that taking property that was not blighted to
give to private developers for the purpose of economic development was not a valid “public
use.” See id at 475–76. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge, afﬁrming prior cases
holding the Takings Clause’s “public use” requirement to permit the state to pursue
through the use of eminent domain any public purpose (including economic development)
that it could legitimately pursue through other means. See id at 483–84. See also Hawaii
Housing Authority v Midkiff, 467 US 229, 240– 43 (1984); Berman v Parker, 348 US 26,
33–36 (1954). As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor put it for the unanimous Court in Midkiff,
“[t]he ‘public use’ requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police
powers.” 467 US at 240.
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domain.94 This focus is also consistent with the general thrust of
substantive due process review, which aims to root out situations
in which the government acts arbitrarily and in ways that cannot
be justiﬁed (even minimally) by reference to permissible government purposes. The Court has employed a similar approach in its
equal protection jurisprudence.95 A conclusion that government
policy or distinction is not rationally related to a permissible government purpose, like a ﬁnding of no public use in eminent domain, often implies that government is impermissibly serving some
private agenda (such as corruption or animus) at the expense of
the public good.96
c. some wrinkles and qualifications
Rule-of-law concerns, broadly construed, seem to offer a theoretically grounded normative explanation for the Nollan/Dolan
inquiry. But it is not entirely clear that these concerns map well
onto the way that inquiry has been structured. Moreover, certain
features associated with rule of law may clash with normatively
94
For example, in a summary of the anti-Kelo backlash ﬁve years after the case was
decided, the property-rights litigators at the Institute for Justice framed the conﬂict in
terms of unequal political inﬂuence:

The parties who gain from eminent domain abuse—in particular, local government ofﬁcials and ﬁnancially powerful private business interests—have disproportionate inﬂuence in the political arena. Not surprisingly, those groups have
fought hard against eminent domain reform in virtually every state where it has
been proposed. Given their tremendous inﬂuence, as well as the fact that ordinary home and business owners do not have lobbyists or special access, the
question that the critics should be asking is: “How on earth did the Kelo backlash
meet with such success?”
Five Years After Kelo: The Sweeping Backlash Against One of the Supreme Court’s Most-Despised
Decisions *5 (Institute for Justice, 2010), online at http://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/
private_property/kelo/kelo5year_ann-white_paper.pdf.
95
The similarity—both in terms of normative underpinnings and legal content—between the substantive due process and equal protection inquiries is most apparent in the
so-called “class of one” equal protection cases, where the claimant alleges she has been
singled out arbitrarily for adverse treatment. See, for example, Village of Willowbrook v
Olech, 528 US 562, 564 (2000) (“[T]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination” (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v Dakota County,
260 US 441, 445 (1927)). But see Engquist v Oregon Dept. of Agr., 553 US 591 (2008)
(refusing to apply a “class of one” analysis to situations in which government action is
necessarily “subjective and individualized” as in the context of public employment).
96
See Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 Ga L Rev 1, 31–32 (2008)
(suggesting that an “orientation to the public good” is a necessary feature of law; thus,
“we might say that nothing is law unless it purports to promote the public good” even if
it does not always manage to do so).
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valuable aspects of the way that land use control is carried out—
or indeed with other rule-of-law principles. The sections below
explore these issues.
1. The problem of favoritism. The Nollan/Dolan inquiry does not
target favoritism directly. It does not engage in the sort of comparative analysis that one would expect from an inquiry motivated
by horizontal equity. Instead, in considering challenges by disfavored developers, the Nollan/Dolan analysis focuses on nexus and
proportionality within the challenged deal only.97 Moreover, even
if nexus and proportionality would produce a general tendency
toward more equal deal making when consistently applied to all
development-related deals, there is reason to doubt such consistency will actually obtain. Signiﬁcantly, the kinds of developers
who seem most likely to be Nollan/Dolan claimants are relatively
inexperienced, one-time players, not the kinds of sophisticated
repeat actors interested in maintaining favorable relationships with
local governments.
Here it becomes important to underscore the difference between the allocation of proof burdens within the Nollan/Dolan
framework and in other contexts that present concerns about favoritism. In the areas of substantive due process, equal protection,
and eminent domain, courts approach their inquiries with a great
deal of deference and with the burden of proof squarely on the
shoulders of the party challenging the government’s bona ﬁdes.
In the exactions context, however, the presumption is reversed. A
primary effect of designating such a domain of heightened scrutiny
is to induce governmental avoidance of litigation within that domain. This might occur either openly, by causing governments to
shift toward forms of regulation that lie outside the realm of intensiﬁed scrutiny,98 or covertly, by steering their bargaining efforts
toward parties who can be trusted not to sue.99
97
Arguably, evidence about other, more favorable deals might come in as part of the
consideration of the proportionality prong of the test.
98
An analogous point has been made about heightened standards for public use in the
eminent domain context, given that governments have the capacity to select alternative
ways of achieving their objectives. See, for example, Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 Colum L Rev 1412, 1416 (2006) (“The Achilles
heel of the anti-Kelo movement is its failure to consider the place of the public use doctrine
within the full arsenal of government regulatory powers over property.”).
99
See Dana, 75 NC L Rev at 1286–99 (cited in note 37) (suggesting that Nollan/Dolan
restrictions can be circumvented through local governments’ reliance on repeat-play developers who can be trusted not to bring legal challenges).
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The Nollan/Dolan framework therefore generates the costs of
heightened scrutiny while leaving a great deal of space for backroom deals. Indeed, the test (particularly if it extends too widely)
may well exacerbate the problem of horizontal inequity by making
land use regulators reluctant to propose horse trading with anyone
but those least likely to turn to the courts for redress: repeat-play
developers.100 Expansive Nollan/Dolan scrutiny, as currently formulated, might well have the effect of driving bargaining underground, which in turn may convert publicly motivated bargaining
over regulatory burdens into a furtive act that does more (and not
less) to undermine the rule of law.101
We might imagine courts using rule-of-law considerations to
construct safe harbors (or domains of less intense scrutiny) into
which local governments would be encouraged to channel their
regulatory activity. In the eminent domain context, for example,
the Court has treated the connection of a land use decision to a
lengthy and public planning process as a reason for judicial deference.102 The Court’s exactions jurisprudence does not currently
incorporate this consideration—either in the substantive nexus and
proportionality analysis, or in setting boundaries for the application of Nollan/Dolan scrutiny. Nonetheless, it is possible that
planning (or other procedures thought to undercut favoritism)
could be used to help distinguish the realm within which the usual
deferential stance should govern from the one in which heightened
scrutiny prevails.103
2. Overreaching against landowners generally. So far, our description of the rule-of-law account of exactions jurisprudence might
create the misimpression that the only axis of conﬂict is between
different would-be developers. But characterizing exactions conﬂicts in this way would disregard the potential for conﬂict between
a political majority and all those who stand to gain by developing
100

See id.

101

See Rose-Ackerman, ed, International Handbook at xviii (cited in note 78) (discussing
the role governmental discretion plays in generating low-level corruption).
102
See Kelo, 545 US at 483–84 (emphasizing that the government’s condemnation of
land was undertaken pursuant to a lengthy and public planning process as a reason for
ﬁnding the use to be sufﬁciently public). See also Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning as Public
Use? 34 Ecology L Q 443, 448 (2007) (“[ I ]n both regulatory takings and public use cases,
the Court often has cited governmental planning efforts to bolster the case for judicial
deference.”).
103
See Shapiro, Legality at 195, 394 –95 (cited in note 82) (discussing the conceptual
links between planning, legality, and the rule of law).
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land. Fears that majoritarian interests will overburden property
owners lie at the heart of the Takings Clause’s protections, and
concern about governmental overreaching (as opposed to differential reaching) is evident in the Court’s exactions jurisprudence.
Thus, some Justices may locate the normative considerations underlying the exactions cases not (just) in concerns about the rule
of law posed by the government’s offers of disparate deals for
different landowners, but (also) in the more straightforward potential for the government to abuse landowners (whether en masse
or individually) through excessively burdensome land use regulation.104
For reasons already suggested in the “bargaining with the opponent’s chips” critique, restrictions on exactions are not especially
well suited to deal with the problem of regulatory excess. Significantly, constraining governmental deal making is not the same as
decreasing the average or total regulatory burden. It is certainly
possible that constraining the government’s ability to bargain away
restrictions would make the government less interested in imposing the restrictions in the ﬁrst place.105 But it is equally plausible that governments prohibited from bargaining will impose
burdens on owners that are (on balance) the same, or perhaps even
greater, than they would impose if they were able to negotiate
customized packages of beneﬁts and burdens with individual landowners. This is particularly true for local governments motivated,
as William Fischel has hypothesized, by voters’ risk aversion about
the value of their homes.106 Thus, the possibility of tyranny by a
local antidevelopment majority, which Fischel has argued is par104
For example, Justice Clarence Thomas asserted in dissent from the denial of certiorari
in Parking Association of Georgia v City of Atlanta, 450 SE2d 200 (Ga 1994), that “the
general applicability of the ordinance should not be relevant in a takings analysis,” and
illustrated his point by observing it would clearly be a taking “if Atlanta had seized several
hundred homes in order to build a freeway.” 515 US 1116, 1118 (1995) (Thomas, J,
dissenting).
105
Alienability limits have sometimes been proposed as a way to address strategic behavior by private actors, by removing the incentive to acquire an entitlement for leverage
purposes only. For example, see generally Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122
Harv L Rev 1403 (2009); Ian Ayres and Kristin Madison, Threatening Inefﬁcient Performance
of Injunctions and Contracts, 148 U Pa L Rev 45 (1999). Governmental bodies may enact
land use restrictions, including inefﬁcient ones, for a variety of reasons other than gaining
bargaining leverage. See text accompanying notes 62–63. See also Fennell, 122 Harv L
Rev at 1455 (discussing and critiquing the use of alienability limits to address insincere
lawmaking in the land use context).
106

William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis 8–10 (Harvard, 2001).
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ticularly salient in locally enacted land use law,107 would not justify
singling out exactions (as opposed to local land use law generally)
for special scrutiny.
While a standard takings analysis of the burdens placed on landowners may offer a more direct and fruitful way to approach this
problem, bargains may muddy the waters in ways that could call
for special scrutiny. Consider, for example, the rise of community
beneﬁt agreements. These are private agreements between developers and community groups that promise community stakeholders speciﬁc beneﬁts, such as jobs or local amenities, in exchange for their acquiescence in the development plan.108 While
governments may view these agreements as a politically attractive
way of collaboratively addressing community concerns, the very
involvement by government produces risks. If channeling beneﬁts
directly to third parties becomes a de facto requirement of development approval, bargains can generate burdens (and not just
beneﬁts) for developers that are not apparent from an examination
of regulatory impositions alone.109 Such opaque burdens raise
many of the same concerns that we have already discussed.
Here it becomes helpful to separate two inquiries that can become entangled in evaluating land use bargains. The ﬁrst, which
standard takings analysis is well equipped to handle, is the severity
of the burden that is imposed on a given landowner or group of
landowners. The second is whether the government’s overall dealings with landowners are consistent with the rule of law. This
inquiry goes to the ﬁt between the procedural and substantive
framework the government has established and the legitimate
goals of the governmental entity. By the Court’s own doctrinal
lights, this is the kind of inquiry that sounds in due process:
whether the government is acting properly. The connection between the burden-severity and rule-of-law questions emerges in
takings cases in the following way: one of the ways in which rule
of law might be undermined is through bargaining processes that
make it too difﬁcult to answer the burden-severity question ac107

See William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings 276–88 (Harvard, 1995).

108

See, for example, Vicki Been, Community Beneﬁts Agreements: A New Local Government
Tool or Another Variation on the Exactions Theme? 77 U Chi L Rev 5, 5–6 (2010).
109
See, for example, id at 27–28 (discussing the possibility that approval by community
groups might be an implicit requirement for development approval, and the associated
legal implications).
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curately and that therefore make it impossible for courts to protect
landowners from excessive regulatory burdens.
But the Nollan/Dolan criteria do not really address this problem.
Their brand of heightened scrutiny is anchored in an application
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine that requires ﬁrst identifying some governmental act that would qualify as an uncompensated taking if divorced from the bargaining context.110 The
concerns associated with rule of law, including the concern that
impermissibly severe uncompensated burdens will be obscured by
the bargaining apparatus, do not depend on ﬁrst identifying such
an uncompensated taking.111 Conversely, the distinctions in the
underlying takings doctrine that are considered critical to the
question of burden severity—such as Loretto’s carve-out for physical takings—have no bearing on whether the government is acting
improperly in its dealings with landowners. Instead, those distinctions go only to the compensability or noncompensability of the
burdens imposed by governmental actors engaged in otherwise
legitimate governmental acts.
There is therefore a fundamental mismatch between the Nollan/
Dolan goals of ferreting out bad government behavior (that, among
other things, might allow it to take from owners in a tricky or
sneaky manner) and the presumption of the Takings Clause that
the governmental conduct in question is otherwise legitimate but
burdensome enough to require compensation.112 Because bad behavior is notoriously shape-shifting and opportunistic, the tools
for addressing it cannot be found in a toolkit devoted to categorizing and evaluating burdens for compensation purposes. What
is required instead are principles that can channel governmental
110

See Part IV.A.3.

111

Conversely, identifying an act that would be a taking if viewed in isolation outside
of the bargaining context does not necessarily establish the existence of a constitutionally
impermissible burden, since the bargain itself may supply the just compensation. See Part
IV.A.4.
112
Of course, an uncompensated regulatory taking implicates concerns that we might
characterize as related to the rule of law. That is, a taking without compensation would
be a kind of lawless act. But it is one anticipated by the Takings Clause itself, which
provides for compensation that (once provided) fully legitimates the governmental act
itself. To be sure, the Court’s rhetoric in regulatory takings cases sometimes conveys
outrage at what are perceived as attempts on the part of governmental entities to take
without paying. But the underlying aims and methods of the governmental body are not
in question in these cases, apart from the isolated issue of whether compensation is required—a question that, for all of its problems, the burden-focused regulatory takings
inquiry has been crafted to address.
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behavior along lines that reduce problems like obfuscation and
corruption—problems that lie outside the domain of the Takings
Clause.113
3. The cost of reducing ﬂexibility. Perhaps the largest concern
with using a rule-of-law approach to mark out the edges of heightened scrutiny is its potential tendency to swallow the entire ﬁeld
of land use control. We have already shown how bargains permeate
the whole of land use regulation, and we have emphasized the
conditionality and tentativeness inherent in the state’s approach
to a resource as unique, enduring, and essential as land.
If conditionality and bargaining are pervasive in land use law,
and if such conditionality raises signiﬁcant rule-of-law concerns,
why not just say so much the worse for land use regulation? That
is, why not just extend exactions scrutiny to land use regulation
across the board? Taken to the extreme, doing so could make land
use regulation prohibitively costly—a bad result for landowners
and government alike. A more modest approach, some incarnations of which we will consider below, would attempt to bleed the
discretion out of the land use process by applying elevated scrutiny
only to those land use regulations that fail to satisfy rule-of-law
criteria like generalizability and publicity—that is, actions that are
ad hoc rather than legislative in character. The effect of applying
heightened exactions scrutiny in this way would not be an unmitigated good, however. A likely result would be a net decrease
in the ﬂexibility and customizability of local land use laws, as
compared to existing practices.
Efforts to specify and address all variations and contingencies
in advance can make lawmaking unnecessarily cumbersome and
costly. At the same time, inﬂexibly applying a single set of land
use rules to every parcel would itself undermine the rule of law
by treating differently situated people the same.114 Moreover, as
113
We will suggest below that the Due Process Clause offers the most suitable home
for this inquiry See Part V.E.1.
114
See Gowder, Equal Law at *11–14 (cited in note 87). Of course, this possibility focuses
our attention on the question of how to identify the sorts of differences that the law can
appropriately take into account when justifying differential treatment. For instance, it
would seem appropriate for the law to treat two parcels differently because of their drainage
characteristics, but not because of the racial makeup of the residents of the neighborhood.
See id. Identifying policy-relevant differences requires adopting or developing a theory
of the kinds of “public reasons” on the basis of which the state is entitled to act. Such an
undertaking, which in turn requires grappling with competing accounts of what is entailed
by state rationality and nonarbitrariness, is beyond the scope of this article. Related ques-

322

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2013

even Fuller recognized, blanket rules that are a poor ﬁt for individualized conditions can spur frequent amendments (instability)
or encourage gaps between the law on the books and law as applied
(incongruence).115 Fuller’s account of rule of law also suggests a
crucial and robust role for market institutions and exchange—one
in which heterogeneity of interests makes possible gains from
trade.116 The inefﬁciencies that may be associated with blocked
bargains between landowners and governments can threaten ruleof-law values by generating pressure (in the form of unexploited
surplus) for illicit deals.
Reducing discretion can also interfere with the ability of governments to appropriately price land use impacts—including positive ones. This consideration becomes increasingly important as
the nation’s population becomes overwhelmingly urbanized. Agglomeration beneﬁts and congestion costs make the relative spatial
placement of people, buildings, and uses—especially within cities—crucially important.117 As John Logan and Harvey Molotch
put it in their classic work on the political economy of land use,
“[e]very parcel of land is unique in the idiosyncratic access it provides to other parcels and uses. . . . In economists’ language, each
property use ‘spills over’ to other parcels and, as part of these
‘externality effects,’ crucially determines what every other property
will be.”118 A local government intent on maximizing positive synergies within cities will not want to charge everyone the same
regulatory “price” to locate or develop in a given place.119 Applying
tions often arise in tax policy discussions. See Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Myth
of Ownership: Taxes and Justice 12 (Oxford, 2002) (referencing “the principle that likesituated persons must be burdened equally and relevantly unlike persons unequally”).
115

See Fuller, The Morality at 39 (cited in note 85).

116

Id at 22–24.
The beneﬁts of agglomeration (including transportation savings, knowledge spillovers, and specialization gains) have long been recognized. See, for example, Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics 328–29 (Macmillan, 1890); J. Vernon Henderson, Urban Scale
Economies, in Ronan Paddison, ed, Handbook of Urban Studies 243, 243– 48 (Sage, 2001).
For recent discussions of trade-offs between agglomeration beneﬁts and congestion costs
in city formation and growth, see generally Luı́s M. A. Bettencourt, The Origins of Scaling
in Cities, 340 Science 1438 (2013); Jeffrey C. Brinkman, Congestion, Agglomeration, and the
Structure of Cities (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper No 13-25, May
2013), online at http://ssrn.com/abstractp2272049. For a discussion connecting agglomeration effects to the law and economics of cities, see generally David Schleicher, The City
as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U Ill L Rev 1507 (2010).
117

118
John R. Logan and Harvey L. Molotch, Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place
23–24 (University of California, 20th ann ed 2007).
119

This is because parties differ in the agglomeration beneﬁts they contribute to urban
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heightened exactions scrutiny too broadly could thus reduce local
governments’ ability to use forms of differential pricing—carried
out through individualized bargaining and other ﬂexibility-enhancing devices—to manage agglomeration effects.120
As this discussion suggests, rule-of-law considerations in the
abstract cannot tell us where to strike the balance between ﬂexibility and predictability.121 But these considerations can tell us what
sort of inquiry is required. This, in turn, can help us identify the
best doctrinal hook for the analysis and, as important, can point
up the shortcomings of existing approaches.
It is noteworthy that many state courts, years before the Supreme Court entered the fray, perceived the need to police bargaining in the land use context.122 Like Nollan/Dolan, these state
law exactions tests typically took the form of an evaluation of the
ﬁt between the conditions imposed and the impact of the proposed
land use.123 To be sure, many of these tests did not burden local
governments with levels of scrutiny as demanding as those established in Nollan and Dolan.124 Yet despite their differences, the
existence of state-law exactions doctrine suggests a widespread
environments (and may have differential effects on congestion as well). See, for example,
Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive Externalities, 54
Wm & Mary L Rev 211, 215–16, 241– 43 (2012) (noting the asymmetry in positive externalities bestowed by larger businesses on their smaller neighbors); see also id at 241–
45 (explaining how shopping malls adjust rents to reﬂect the relative contributions of
“anchor stores” and smaller shops). Differential pricing is likewise used in a variety of
other contexts where the mix of users or customers impacts the product or experience
produced. See, for example, Michael Rothschild and Lawrence J. White, The Analytics of
the Pricing of Higher Education and Other Services in Which the Customers Are Inputs, 103 J
Pol Econ 573, 575–76 (1995).
120
See Ronit Levine-Schnur, Koontz, Bargained Land Development, and the Rationales of
Land Use Law *47–52 (unpublished article, Apr 2013), online at http://law.huji.ac.il/upload/
KoontzBargained.pdf (proposing an approach to exactions jurisprudence that would take
into account differential contributions to and draws from urban surpluses). For reﬂections
on how land use regulations inﬂuence and structure the “location market” within cities,
see generally Daniel B. Rodriguez and David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19 Geo
Mason L Rev 637 (2012).
121
Shapiro, Legality at 398 (cited in note 82) (“Legal systems have no choice but to
decide how to balance the needs for guidance, predictability, and constraint on the one
hand against the beneﬁts of ﬂexibility, spontaneity, and discretion on the other. Legal
systems, therefore, not only must heed the Rule of Law but also must have views about
how the Rule of Law itself is best heeded.”).
122
123

See Dolan, 512 US at 389–91 (discussing state law exactions scrutiny).

See id.
See, for example, Jenad, Inc. v Village of Scarsdale, 218 NE2d 673, 676 (NY 1966)
(partial abrogation by Dolan recognized in Twin Lakes Development Corp. v Town of Monroe,
801 NE2d 821, 826 (NY 2003)).
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perception that land use regulatory deal making constitutes a discrete and problematic identiﬁable category of governmental action
in need of judicial oversight. We have suggested that this perception may ﬁnd normative footing in rule-of-law concerns. While
those normative roots ﬁt imperfectly with exactions jurisprudence
as it has developed, they may nonetheless offer useful guidance
going forward.
IV. Searching for Limits Within Koontz
Having surveyed the normative terrain, we can return to
the hard question of how the Court might cabin its exactions
jurisprudence given its dual goals of protecting meaningful land
use regulation and restraining local land use power. In this part,
we turn explicitly to the Koontz decision for insight into the limiting principles that remain open to the Court, as well as the ones
that it seems to have foreclosed.
Before Koontz, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and substantive takings law seemed to embed constraints on the reach of
Nollan and Dolan. A claimant seeking heightened means-ends exactions scrutiny would ﬁrst need to clear two preliminary hurdles.
For starters, she would need to show that the government was
attempting to bargain—expressly offering to release the landowner
from a discretionary regulatory burden in exchange for some valuable concession by the landowner. Second, she would have to
show that the concession sought by the government was one that
would, on its own, violate the Takings Clause if simply imposed
by the state.
Lingle and Del Monte Dunes further hinted that only those land
use interactions that cleared these two hurdles in the clearest and
most prototypical way—bargains initiated through an ad hoc or adjudicative process to appropriate tangible interests in real property—
would trigger Nollan/Dolan scrutiny.125 The ad hoc element would
have limited the exactions doctrine to the most unambiguous of
bargains: those that were available only to particular landowners
on an individually negotiated, case-by-case basis. Limiting the
doctrine to demands for physical interests in real property would
have reserved heightened exactions scrutiny for bargains involving
the clearest, most easily identiﬁable type of takings: per se Loretto
125

See Part I.C.
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takings, which the Court has deemed so uniquely intrusive as to
justify categorical treatment.126
In Koontz, however, the Court jettisoned the requirement of a
physical exaction and remained conspicuously silent (despite prodding from the dissent) about where it stood on the legislative/
adjudicative distinction.127 With one limit clearly off the table and
the second deferred to another day, what can we discern from the
Koontz opinion about the boundary principles it meant to apply?
Such limits might relate either to the nature of the concession or
burden the government demands, or to the nature of the interaction or bargain between the government and the landowner.
The sections below examine the Court’s treatment of each of these
dimensions.
a. burden-related limits
The Koontz majority decisively rejected the distinction between
physical exactions of land and monetary exactions. It also indicated
that it viewed at least some subset of monetary impositions connected to identiﬁable land as per se takings. But it left several
crucial questions unanswered that will have profound implications
for the scope of heightened exactions scrutiny and for takings
analysis more generally. First, what distinguishes the monetary
obligations that trigger exactions scrutiny from those that do not?
Second, what is the status, for purposes of exactions analysis, of
in-kind regulatory burdens that are neither physical appropriations
of land nor monetary impositions? Third, and closely related, is
it still necessary for a burden to constitute a “taking on its own”
in order to trigger heightened scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan—
and if so, what does “on its own” mean? Fourth, what role, if any,
does in-kind compensation play in thinking about the constitutional foundations of exactions analysis?
1. Which monetary obligations? The Koontz majority held that
126
See Lingle v Chevron, 544 US 528, 538 (2005) (“The Court has held that physical
takings require compensation because of the unique burden they impose . . . .”). Although
limiting qualifying burdens to physical takings might seem arbitrary, it tracks a quirk in
the underlying takings jurisprudence: the categorical treatment that permanent physical
occupations receive under Loretto, which diverges dramatically from the Penn Central
treatment that usually governs regulatory takings inquiries, as well as from the treatment
that most monetary burdens had received prior to Koontz. See Part I.A.
127
We will take up below the possibility that the Court might ultimately adopt the
legislative/adjudicative distinction it dodged in Koontz. See Part V.A.
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conditioning development on a monetary obligation triggers
heightened scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan. But which monetary
obligations qualify for this treatment? Because there is no clear
indication that the Court meant to jettison the requirement that
the burden in question constitute a taking on its own—a point we
will revisit below—we might start by supposing that only those
monetary impositions that constitute per se takings will trigger
heightened scrutiny. This approach gets us little traction, however.
Until Koontz, monetary impositions were not thought to constitute takings at all, much less per se takings, outside of very
limited contexts. The relatively narrow exception articulated in
Brown v Legal Foundation of Washington128 involved situations in
which the government seized some discrete pool of money (in
Brown, the interest earned by a particular trust account). The basis
for this exception has never fully been ﬂeshed out by the Court,
but its scope was typically understood to be self-limiting.129 Even
the plurality in Eastern Enterprises only concluded that the monetary obligation in that case worked a taking after going through
the full Penn Central analysis.130
Koontz thus moved into uncharted waters by suggesting that
generalized monetary obligations tied to identiﬁable land (or some
not-fully-speciﬁed subset of such monetary impositions) count as
per se takings. Justice Alito’s opinion for the majority expressly
refers to the petitioner’s case as being premised on a per se taking
of money, citing Brown.131 Later, he states that “any such demand
[for a monetary expenditure linked to land] would amount to a
per se taking similar to the taking of an easement or a lien.”132
But all monetary obligations imposed on land holdings, including
such ubiquitous tools as property taxes, special assessments, and
permitting fees, share this connection to ownership of speciﬁc
parcels of land.133 And the Koontz majority insists that it does not
mean to sweep all of these impositions into the compass of exactions scrutiny.
We know, then, that some subset (and only some subset) of
128
129

538 US 216 (2003).
See Merrill, 86 Va L Rev at 903– 07 (cited in note 52).

130

See Eastern Enterprises, 524 US at 522–23.

131

Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2600.

132

Id.

133

See id at 2606– 07 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
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monetary impositions tied to land now qualify as per se takings
that will trigger exactions analysis. But the Koontz majority does
not articulate any principle that would distinguish the routine
impositions it means to exempt from heightened scrutiny from
the sorts of land-related monetary obligations it intended to subject to heightened scrutiny. Justice Alito’s opinion instead points
to the Court’s distinction between takings and taxes in Brown as
proof that such a distinction is possible—without acknowledging
the sea change in the coverage of Brown that the Koontz opinion
itself seems to work.
The majority also ﬁnds reassurance in state court cases deﬁning
“taxes.”134 But these cases typically involve judicial efforts to interpret state-law restrictions on local governments’ power to tax,
restrictions generally understood not to reach things like “fees.”135
The Koontz Court apparently meant to shield both taxes and fees
(at least routine user fees) from heightened scrutiny.136 The boundaries of state delegations of revenue-raising power to local governments seem entirely orthogonal to the meaning of a federal
constitutional provision focused on the relationship between individual property owners and the state. It is not impossible, however, that state law procedural prerequisites for taxes, such as the
requirement that they be enacted by the legislature, could provide
a back-door way for the Court to import something like the legislative/adjudicative distinction that it studiously avoided drawing
in Koontz.137
A different (if somewhat recursive) way of deﬁning the subset
134

See Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2602 n 3.
See, for example, Elizabeth River Crossings OPCO v Meeks, 749 SE2d 176 (Va 2013)
(distinguishing “taxes” from “user fees” and rejecting a claim that the Virginia legislature
had improperly delegated taxing power to a transportation authority responsible for operating a tunnel between Portsmouth and Norfolk); Silva v City of Attleboro, 908 NE2d
722 (Mass 2009) (reviewing the standards for distinguishing taxes from fees for state law
purposes and ﬁnding that a charge for a burial permit falls in the latter category and hence
was lawfully imposed by the city).
135

136
133 S Ct at 2600 – 01 (“It is beyond dispute that ‘[t]axes and user fees . . . are not
“takings.”’ . . . . This case therefore does not affect the ability of governments to impose
property taxes, user fees, and similar laws and regulations that may impose ﬁnancial burdens
on property owners.”) (quoting Brown, 538 US at 243 n 2) (Scalia, J, dissenting)).
137
Suggestive in this regard is the Court’s explanation of why the monetary imposition
in Brown could not have been a tax, due to state law: “in Washington, taxes are levied by
the legislature, not the courts.” Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2601. Although the point is not
developed further, it is likely that the Court will eventually have to confront the question
of whether heightened exactions scrutiny exempts some or all legislative enactments. See
Parts V.A and V.B.
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of monetary impositions subject to heightened scrutiny would
make the imposition’s appearance in a bargaining context relevant
to the question. The idea might be that the government’s choice
to isolate a particular burden by demanding it as a quid pro quo
fundamentally alters the way the burden is understood. Thus,
money demanded in exchange for development permission is
viewed as different than money demanded unconditionally—with
only the former, and not the latter, potentially amounting to a per
se taking.
One piece of evidence for this interpretation is Justice Alito’s
puzzling statement that Koontz’s claim—that a monetary imposition tied to land is a per se taking—is “more limited” than would
be a claim that such a monetary imposition triggered a Penn Central
inquiry.138 How could declaring a wide swath of monetary impositions to be per se takings be “more limited” than applying the
much more forgiving Penn Central standard to them? The answer
could be that Justice Alito viewed his Koontz pronouncements
about per se takings as somehow limited to the exactions context
rather than applying to the larger realm of takings law. This way
of viewing the case would conﬁne the effects of Koontz to exactions
cases, but it would put increased pressure on the problem of determining which interactions count as exactions.
The Court in Koontz clearly wanted to treat monetary exactions
just like physical exactions to keep local governments from using
the former as a substitute for the latter. The problem, however,
is that physical appropriations had up until Koontz been treated
differently under takings law than most monetary impositions. To
maintain the symmetry between in-kind exactions and in-lieu payments by treating both as per se takings, the Court may have
signiﬁcantly widened the domain of takings law as it applies to
monetary obligations.
2. What about regulatory burdens? Although Koontz’s treatment
of monetary impositions has received the lion’s share of scholarly
attention, the case leaves unanswered another question with farreaching implications: what about the wide range of regulatory
burdens that are accepted (or proposed) in exchange for development permission? Many conditions do not take the form of
monetary impositions and also do not amount to physical appro138

See Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2600.
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priations of property. Such in-kind regulatory conditions on development are ubiquitous, including set-back requirements, parking and landscaping requirements, limits on hours of operation,
and many more. None of these would be a taking on its own under
standard takings analysis. The post-Koontz treatment of regulatory
burdens, then, depends crucially on another question that the
Court left unanswered in Koontz—the status of the “taking on its
own” requirement.
3. A taking on its own. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine
is premised on the notion that the government is asking the claimant to trade away a constitutionally protected right in order to
receive a discretionary government beneﬁt.139 Accordingly, it
seems to require a burden that would constitute a taking on its
own if imposed outright. And, indeed, in Nollan and Dolan the
Supreme Court’s application of heightened scrutiny proceeded on
the assumption that the government had conditioned development
approval on the conveyance by the claimant of an interest in property that the government could not simply have taken on its own
without triggering the duty to pay just compensation under the
Takings Clause.140 As Justice Kagan put it in her Koontz dissent,
Nollan and Dolan “apply only if the demand would have constituted
a taking when executed outside the permitting process.”141
Despite the dearth of substantive takings analysis in the majority
opinion, there is no clear indication that the Koontz Court intended
to do away with the requirement that the state’s demand—if unilaterally imposed—constitute a taking on its own. On the contrary,
the majority considered the monetary obligation imposed by the
state to be the sort of state action that would count as a per se
taking if imposed by the state. But retaining the “taking on its
139
See, for example, Sullivan, 102 Harv L Rev at 1415 (cited in note 34) (“The doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions holds that government may not grant a beneﬁt on the
condition that the beneﬁciary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government
may withhold that beneﬁt altogether.”).
140
See Nollan 483 US at 831 (“Had California simply required the Nollans to make an
easement across their beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis in order to
increase public access to the beach . . . we have no doubt there would have been a taking.”);
Dolan, 512 US at 384 (1994) (“Without question, had the city simply required petitioner
to dedicate a strip of land along Fanno Creek for public use, rather than conditioning the
grant of her permit to redevelop her property on such a dedication, a taking would have
occurred.”); see also Lingle, 544 US at 546 (“In each case [Nollan and Dolan], the Court
began with the premise that, had the government simply appropriated the easement in
question, this would have been a per se physical taking.”).
141

133 S Ct at 2607 (Kagan, J, dissenting).
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own” prerequisite raises the question of how the idea of “on its
own” should be interpreted outside of the speciﬁc facts in Koontz.
Interestingly, the Court did not have to confront this question as
long as it limited heightened scrutiny to physical exactions. The
Court’s carve-out in Loretto makes any permanent physical appropriation—no matter how small, no matter how insigniﬁcant in
proportion to the rest of the parcel—a taking on its own. The
presence of a physical Loretto taking has the interesting effect of
making the overall context in which the imposition occurs irrelevant—one can combine a permanent physical occupation with
any other property elements one likes, and it is still a taking.
By contrast, context is tremendously relevant for the rest of
takings analysis. Penn Central’s framework uses a “parcel as a
whole” approach to determine whether landowners have been saddled with burdens that should instead be spread across society.142
The infamous “denominator problem” arises in both Penn Central
and Lucas analyses precisely because it is necessary to consider
impositions in a context larger than the regulatory burden itself.143
If every small regulatory act were treated as a Loretto taking, regardless of how it were situated within the overall framework of
beneﬁts and burdens, “government hardly could go on.”144
142

Penn Central, 438 US at 130 –31.

143

A central inquiry in takings analysis is the degree of diminution in value (or, at the
extreme, deprivation of all economically viable use). To determine how much the value
of a piece of property has diminished or whether all economically viable use has been
eliminated, one must ﬁrst establish the base against which the diminution is to be measured:
the denominator. For example, a ten-acre plot might be subject to a regulation that destroys
entirely the value of one acre. How much the plot’s value has diminished depends on
whether each acre is considered separately, or whether the whole plot is considered together. See Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1016–17 n 7 (1992)
(discussing this difﬁculty using a similar example and observing that “uncertainty regarding
the composition of the denominator in our ‘deprivation’ fraction has produced inconsistent
pronouncements by the Court”). The Court has, however, rejected “conceptual severance”
that would enable a landowner to deﬁne the property interest by reference to the scope
of the regulation itself. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 535 US 302, 326–27, 331 (2002); see also Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 Colum L Rev 1667,
1674 –79 (1988) (coining the term “conceptual severance” and discussing how the concept
had been treated in past takings cases).
144
Pennsylvania Coal v Mahon, 260 US 393, 413 (1922) (Holmes, J). Oregon’s ill-fated
experiment with Measure 37 demonstrates the unworkability of a compensation requirement that attaches to even the smallest diminutions in value. Before being largely gutted
through the subsequent adoption of Measure 49, Measure 37 required local governments
to either lift restrictions that reduced property values or compensate for them. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, local governments overwhelmingly elected the former alternative, essentially making the regulation of land use impossible to carry on. See Bethany R. Berger,
What Owners Want and Governments Do: Evidence from the Oregon Experiment, 78 Fordham
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This is even more true where monetary impositions are concerned. Before Koontz, these had never even been treated as subject
to takings analysis outside of the narrow context of speciﬁcally
designated funds, liens placed on speciﬁc property, and the like.
It is not workable or logically cohesive to treat all monetary obligations relating to land as Loretto takings. Yet to put some obligations outside the Loretto box while leaving others inside requires a preliminary sorting task that inevitably draws on the
surrounding context and purpose of particular monetary obligations.145
The reason is simple. Very few governmental burdens—including taxes and fees—would survive even the most deferential constitutional review if they were examined in isolation from their
wider contexts. If the government summarily ordered you to hand
over a certain sum of money, or to undertake certain costly tasks,
this surely would look like some sort of constitutional violation.
But if the sum of money involved were your property tax liability,
or if the task involved simply remediating harmful conditions on
your property, the apparent inﬁrmity would disappear—at least in
the absence of some extraordinary facts not given here. The difﬁculty is in determining which aspects of the surrounding context
can be taken into account in deciding whether there is a constitutional right up for trade that would trigger Nollan/Dolan analysis.
Now that the Court has unmoored Brown from its prior grounding in speciﬁc funds, monetary Loretto takings can no longer be
identiﬁed in a context-free way. Yet the Koontz Court was adamant
that no Penn Central analysis was necessary.146 So it would seem
that the Court has in mind some impressionistic initial step, conducted outside of ordinary takings doctrine, in which it classiﬁes
some monetary impositions related to land as Loretto takings that
trigger Nollan/Dolan analysis, and some monetary impositions as
taxes or fees that are wholly exempt from takings analysis.
Whether the Court has in mind a similar preliminary assessment
L Rev 1281, 1284 (2009) (“In only one claim, out of the over 7000 Measure 37 claims
ﬁled, did the state or municipality choose to compensate the property owners rather than
waive the regulation.”).
145
To be clear, consideration of the surrounding context is built into the nexus and
proportionality requirements used to assess the permissibility of a given exaction, after it
is initially ﬂagged for heightened scrutiny. The discussion in the text goes to an antecedent
question: when and how will the surrounding context be used to decide whether heightened
scrutiny applies in the ﬁrst place?
146

Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2600.
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of conditional regulatory burdens that fall short of permanent
physical occupations is unclear. The same circumvention concerns
that led the Court to reject the distinction between monetary and
physical exactions could lead the Court to reject an interpretation
that would immunize non-Loretto regulatory burdens from exactions scrutiny. Here too, the Court’s desire for consistency in the
exactions arena may clash with distinctions that have been hammered out in the underlying takings doctrines, potentially putting
pressure on those doctrines.
In Koontz, a nonphysical regulatory alternative was offered to
the landowner: preserving more of the property in an undeveloped
state under a conservation easement. Because that alternative
would have apparently allowed Koontz to make viable use of his
property, and because it would not have compromised his right
to exclude as did the access easements at issue in Nollan and Dolan,
it seems inconceivable that it would amount to a per se taking
under existing doctrine.147 And the Court never says that it does.148
Curiously, though, Justice Alito’s opinion implies that every alternative offered to Koontz was a potential Nollan/Dolan violation:
the majority states that even one valid alternative would be sufﬁcient to save the proposed bargain from unconstitutionality.149
We think the most plausible interpretation that emerges from
the Court’s discussion is that it reframed the regulatory alternative
offered to Koontz in a way that effectively tainted it with the
monetary exaction and thereby denied it status as a stand-alone
alternative.150 If this is so, then nothing in Koontz reads directly
147
But see Ilya Somin, Two Steps Forward for the “Poor Relation” of Constitutional Law:
Koontz, Arkansas Game & Fish, and the Future of the Takings Clause, 2012–13 Cato S Ct
Rev 215, 236 (2013) (observing in connection with the conservation easement condition
in Koontz that “[f ]orcing a property owner to allow an easement surely would be a taking
even outside the permitting process”). The easement at issue in Koontz was a negative
easement that restricted development ( just as zoning codes do ubiquitously), not an afﬁrmative easement that granted access to the property like the ones at issue in Nollan and
Dolan. While Somin is aware of this distinction, see id at 237, he does not appear to fully
appreciate its potential signiﬁcance under takings law.
148
Had it engaged in a takings analysis of the restriction on development, the Court
would have needed to proceed under Penn Central or (more implausibly) Lucas; there is
no basis for claiming that such a restriction amounts to a Loretto physical taking.
149
133 S Ct at 2598 (“We agree with respondent that, so long as a permitting authority
offers the landowner at least one alternative that would satisfy Nollan and Dolan, the
landowner has not been subjected to an unconstitutional condition.”).
150
In brief, because the regulatory burden could be avoided by paying money, and
because paying money was framed as a per se taking, the regulatory avoidance opportunity
was seemingly framed as just another way in which the District tried to “extort” money
from the individual. See id. This interpretation is explored in Part V.C.2.
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on the status of purely in-kind regulatory conditions (conditions,
that is, that are not paired with a monetary alternative). The question remains, however, whether the usual rules of takings analysis—ones that examine the surrounding context to determine
whether a burden rises to the level requiring just compensation—
continue to apply after Koontz to limit the class of impositions
that will trigger heightened exactions scrutiny.
The problem the Court confronts is not limited to takings jurisprudence; similar questions of bundling and framing run
through the unconstitutional conditions doctrine more generally.151 The Fourth Amendment challenge in Wyman v James152
illustrates the problem well. There, receipt of welfare beneﬁts
under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program was conditioned on a visit to the recipient’s home. Considered on its own, the mandatory visit would seem to be plainly
unconstitutional: a government agent cannot simply force her way
into the home of a random citizen for a friendly chat. But the
Court held that the AFDC home visit was not a search at all within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, much less an unreasonable
one, given the level of intrusion involved and the governmental
interest in determining eligibility for beneﬁts.153 That is, the Court
used the very beneﬁt for which the burden was being traded to
conclude that the burden did not implicate a constitutional right.
As this example shows, a key reason that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine is so disordered is that it is never quite clear
when the beneﬁt that is granted in exchange for ostensibly giving
up a constitutional right is relevant to the question whether one
is being asked to give up a constitutional right.154 The problem is
exacerbated in the takings context not only by the muddy and
151
See generally Adam B. Cox and Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Questions
Everywhere: The Implications of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and Theory, 5 J Legal
Analysis 61 (2013); Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 Yale
L J 1311 (2002).
152

400 US 309 (1971).

153

The Court ﬁrst found that there was no search in the Fourth Amendment sense. Id
at 317–18. The Court went on to opine in the alternative that even if there were a search,
it would be a reasonable one, given its nature and purpose. Id at 318–24.
154
A somewhat parallel issue arose in Penn Central with respect to the treatment of
transfer development rights (TDRs). In the majority’s view, the fact that the restrictions
associated with historic landmark status were accompanied by TDRs counted as a point
in favor of ﬁnding those restrictions not to work a taking. 438 US 136–37. The dissent
argued that TDRs should enter the analysis only in order to determine whether they
constituted just compensation for the taking. Id at 150–52 (Rehnquist, J, dissenting).
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context-speciﬁc nature of the underlying takings analysis, but also
by the fact that one type of exchange—property for just compensation—can be constitutionally unproblematic even when it is involuntary.
4. The role of compensation. Substantive takings law contains a
unique feature: the payment of just compensation removes the
constitutional inﬁrmity associated with an involuntary taking for
public use. Only a broken bundle—a taking for public use without
just compensation—presents a constitutional violation.155 The takings context thus differs from other contexts in which parties may
be asked to waive their constitutional rights in exchange for beneﬁts. Where the waiver of a right must be voluntary to be effective,
it is capable of being improperly coerced. However, there is no
possibility of improperly coercing a property owner to accept just
compensation in exchange for her property since her consent is
not required at all; the government has every right to simply compel the exchange when it does so for public use.
How should this background fact change our assessment of the
(ostensibly) voluntary interactions in which landowners and governments engage over development rights? In a sense, we can
understand the parties to be bargaining in the shadow of eminent
domain. This is not thought to be problematic in the actual context
of eminent domain: the government can (indeed typically must)
ﬁrst attempt a voluntary purchase before resorting to condemnation, and if the landowner agrees to it, there is no claim that
she has been coerced to give up her right to just compensation.156
Exactions present a similar scenario: a landowner’s acceptance
of an in-kind regulatory beneﬁt (development permission) in exchange for a taking for which she could have otherwise received
just compensation. The landowner’s acceptance might suggest that
the in-kind beneﬁt was preferred to just compensation.157 No less
155
Although the Takings Clause is the focus of the Court’s exactions analysis, it is
possible that monetary or regulatory impositions could implicate another constitutional
provision, such as the Due Process Clause. See Eduardo Peñalver, A Few More Thoughts
About Koontz, PrawsfBlawg (June 26, 2013), online at http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2013/06/takings-and-taxes-after-koontz.html (observing that “there is no reason why the underlying constitutional violation has to be a taking—it could be a ﬁrst
amendment violation, a violation of the due process clause, etc.”).
156

See, for example, NY Eminent Domain Procedure Law § 303.
Perhaps some landowners are not fully informed about their rights and would not
understand that just compensation would be available for a given concession, if it were
demanded in isolation. But it would be possible to offer just compensation as an explicit
157
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of a property rights proponent than Richard Epstein has suggested
that just compensation can be provided in kind as well as in cash.158
If it is permissible for just compensation to be provided in kind,
and if an individual prefers an in-kind beneﬁt to monetary just
compensation, hasn’t just compensation then been provided?159
Justice Alito’s discussion of the constitutional problem with exactions in his majority opinion in Koontz provides an emphatic
negative answer:
By conditioning a building permit on the owner’s deeding over a public
right-of-way, for example, the government can pressure an owner into
voluntarily giving up property for which the Fifth Amendment would
otherwise require just compensation. . . . So long as the building permit
is more valuable than any just compensation the owner could hope to
receive for the right-of-way, the owner is likely to accede to the government’s demand, no matter how unreasonable. Extortionate demands
of this sort frustrate the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation,
and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits them.160

This argument has implications for substantive takings law that
are both puzzling and troubling. Why would providing something
that the landowner herself deems more valuable than just compensation “frustrate the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation”? The implicit claim must be that the government has somehow acted wrongly in failing to provide the desired beneﬁt for
free. But nothing in the Court’s analysis supplies the basis for this
assertion.
The mystery only deepens when monetary exactions are considered. Here, the property that is being taken is money. What just
compensation would a person be entitled to for a taking of money?
Presumably, the money back again. But if every payment made to
the government in connection with land will be evaluated in isolation and marked as a per se taking, and if nothing other than
alternative to the regulatory beneﬁt in question. Douglas Kendall and James Ryan proposed
just such an approach, although they admitted some doubts about its constitutionality.
Douglas T. Kendall and James E. Ryan, “Paying” for the Change: Using Eminent Domain
to Secure Exactions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 Va L Rev 1801, 1803– 04 (1995).
158
See Epstein, Takings at 195 (cited in note 50) (“The Constitution speaks only of ‘just’
compensation, not of the form it must take.”); id at 195–215 (developing the idea of
implicit in-kind compensation).
159
See Kendall and Ryan, 81 Va L Rev at 1843– 44 (cited in note 157) (suggesting that
disallowing the waiver of monetary just compensation in favor of in-kind compensation
would be inconsistent with the property-protection rationale underlying the just compensation requirement).
160

Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2594 –95 (internal citations omitted).
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monetary just compensation will cure this constitutional inﬁrmity,
then the analysis spelled out in Koontz would appear to broadly
disable local governments from collecting land-related monetary
payments.161 Even if—indeed, especially if—the beneﬁts provided
in exchange appeared much more attractive to the landowner than
the monetary payment, nothing but having the money itself back
would apparently sufﬁce under the majority’s reading of the just
compensation requirement. The Court’s expansion of exactions
doctrine thus throws into doubt all manner of fees and assessments.
Clearly this is not what the Court had in mind. It obviously
wanted to leave intact all monetary impositions related to land
except extortionate ones. But sifting through every imposition to
identify the bad ones is no trivial exercise; it involves a signiﬁcant
recalibration of the relationship between federal courts and other
government actors. Courts need some principle for deﬁning at the
outset the boundaries separating heightened exactions scrutiny
from its more traditional, deferential analysis. But, apart from
rejecting the Florida Supreme Court’s use of the distinction between monetary and in-kind exactions, the Court in Koontz offers
few clues for identifying those boundaries.
b. bargain-related limits
The distinction between ordinary land use restrictions and land
use regulatory bargains is extremely unstable, for reasons that we
161
The difﬁculty stems from two facets of the Court’s analysis. First, in counting monetary impositions as an appropriate predicate for exactions scrutiny, the majority appears
to be saying that as a matter of substantive takings law, some subset of monetary impositions
linked to identiﬁable land will now count as per se Loretto takings. This on its own creates
grave difﬁculties, ones that the majority tries to minimize by emphasizing that of course
they do not mean for this new rule to reach ordinary taxes and fees, which have never
been considered takings. The Court, however, does not offer a principled basis for its
distinction between the different categories of monetary impositions. In addition, the
problem reenters the analysis at a second point. Exactions analysis by its very nature
separates out what is demanded from what is provided in return, and applies heightened
scrutiny to interrogate the relationship between those elements. To exempt taxes and fees
from this analysis means that in some category of cases courts will not undertake this
separate-and-interrogate move at all. Yet the reason can never be, as Justice Alito’s analysis
makes clear, that the implicit or explicit consent of the landowner to the payment arrangement pulls it out of the domain of constitutional concern. Something else—something
not speciﬁed by the Court—must do so. To be sure, it is fully in alignment with unconstitutional conditions analysis to disregard a citizen’s consent to cede her constitutional
rights. See generally Hamburger, 98 Va L Rev 479 (cited in note 34). What makes applying
the principle so problematic here is that (unlike in any other context) the Court seems
to be disabling landowners from consenting to pay money to the government, regardless
of how highly they value what they receive in exchange.
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have already discussed in Part II. The Court tiptoed around this
instability in Del Monte Dunes and Lingle. But it plowed headlong
into it in Koontz. Not only did it speak unclearly about the nature
of the burden that qualiﬁes for heightened scrutiny, it also disavowed some potential markers relating to the nature of qualifying
bargains.
All of the Justices rejected as excessively formalistic the distinction the Florida Supreme Court had drawn between an exaction that takes the form of a condition precedent (denial of a
permit “until condition X is satisﬁed”) and one that takes the form
of a condition subsequent (issuance of a permit “subject to condition X”). Thus, “failed exactions,” as Mark Fenster has called
them,162 also receive Nollan/Dolan scrutiny. But failed exactions are
far more heterogeneous than completed exactions, as Justice Kagan’s dissent underscores.163 When a permit is actually issued with
a burden attached to it, the link between the beneﬁt proffered and
the burden demanded is clear, as is the demand itself. When a
permit is denied, however, the reasons may be opaque, multiple,
or contested. The Court does not mean to second-guess all permit
denials, presumably. But how is it possible to pick out which denials receive heightened scrutiny?
One possibility would be to examine the factual record for evidence that the local government explicitly demanded the burden
in question prior to denying the permit, effectively linking the
unmet demand to the denied permit. But determining whether a
demand has been made is itself problematic, as Koontz illustrates.
The dissent in Koontz disagreed that there was any such demand,164
while the majority declined to address whether the District’s “demands for property were too indeﬁnite to give rise to liability.”165
This ambiguity about the existence and nature of the demand is
unsurprising. The ﬂuid and often informal nature of discussions
between landowners and land use regulators make the identiﬁcation of “demands” a difﬁcult proposition, as our earlier discussion of Option X emphasized. In light of Koontz, we might expect
more guarded and ambiguous conversations and less reason-giving
162

Fenster, 36 Vt L Rev 623 (cited in note 36).
See Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2610–11 (Kagan, J, dissenting); see also Fenster, Substantive
Due Process at *8 (cited in note 4).
163

164

133 S Ct at 2609–11 (Kagan, J, dissenting).

165

Id at 2598.
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associated with permit denial if an explicit demand were a prerequisite to an exactions challenge.166 This will have the effect of
making it even harder to determine the existence of demands in
the future.
While formalistic when considered on its own terms, the Florida
Supreme Court’s position had the virtue of providing a clear
boundary principle for determining which demands would be subjected to the exactions test. Given Koontz’s rejection of it, what
other boundaries might be constructed to hive off the kinds of
interactions that will trigger Nollan/Dolan analysis?
c. taking stock
To appreciate where Koontz leaves us, it is helpful to brieﬂy
revisit the two dimensions along which boundaries on the scope
of heightened scrutiny might be constructed: (1) the nature of the
concession or burden that the government asks the landowner to
accept, and (2) the nature of the interaction or bargain between
the government and the landowner.
As Figure 4 illustrates, burdens can be arrayed along a spectrum
that runs from general obligations (a requirement to pay or spend
money) to the taking of speciﬁc assets (e.g., taking over an access
easement).167 Bargains can be arrayed along a spectrum from individualized (ad hoc deals) to formulaic (e.g., tax schedules). The
facts of Nollan and Dolan fall in Cell I in this schematic; they
involved exactions that would otherwise be per se takings of land,
and were carried out through an individualized administrative or
adjudicative process. The Court in Koontz expressly extended the
reach of heightened scrutiny into (at least) Cell II by making a
general obligation to spend or pay money, when tied to land, a
qualifying burden type.168 The Koontz majority also indicated that
166
Justice Kagan sensibly raises a concern about chilling communications between landowners and local governments if unequivocal demands are not required. See id at 2610
(Kagan, J, dissenting) (“If a local government risked a lawsuit every time it made a suggestion to an applicant about how to meet permitting criteria, it would cease to do so;
indeed, the government might desist altogether from communicating with applicants.”).
But if explicit demands are required, communication is still likely to change in ways that
may not improve the administration of land use.
167
168

There are other ways in which burdens might be differentiated. See Part V.C.

See Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2598–2603. Signiﬁcantly, the facts of Koontz suggest that
the monetary impositions at issue might well be categorized as falling within Cell IV, and
not Cell II. After all, the District’s demands were based on policies it had implemented
in negotiations with other landowners seeking permission to ﬁll wetlands. See note 9 and
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Figure 4. Burdens and bargains

it did not mean to extend heightened scrutiny fully into Cell IV,
the domain of ordinary taxes.169 But because it did not explain
why, it is uncertain whether all formulaic monetary impositions
would be exempt from Nollan/Dolan analysis. The status of Cell
III—formulaic applications that burden speciﬁc assets—also remains unclear after Koontz.170
V. A Way Forward?
Koontz left the Court’s exactions and takings jurisprudence
in a confused and unsustainable state that will demand further
elaboration (or amendment) in coming Terms. What path can,
will, or should the Court take? The framework presented in Figure
accompanying text. Moreover, although the Court clearly treated the remediation conditions set by the District as monetary in nature, the fact that they involved spending
money on discrete projects rather than paying it to the government could move the case
closer to Figure 4’s top row.
169
170

Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2600–02.

An example would be a legislative enactment that dictates the dedication of a certain
portion of property for public use. See, for example, Parking Ass’n of Georgia v City of
Atlanta, 450 SE2d 200 (Ga 1994), cert denied, 515 US 1116 (1995) (Atlanta City ordinance
requiring owners of surface parking lots to set aside 10% of the area for landscaping and
provide one tree for every eight parking spaces).
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4 above can help to structure the inquiry. The Court might keep
in place its existing pattern of decisions and construct boundaries
around the domain of heightened scrutiny that would exempt all
legislative enactments (Cells III and IV) or just formulaic monetary
impositions (Cell IV). Or it might draw lines along different dimensions and split up one or more of Figure 4’s cells. More radical
(and much less likely) alternatives would involve the Court overruling past decisions to bring all of the quadrants in Figure 4
either inside or outside the domain of heightened scrutiny.171 The
sections below explore these possibilities.
a. the legislative/adjudicative distinction
Discussed by the dissent and adopted by a number of states,
one possible distinction the Court might adopt would limit exactions scrutiny to burdens that are imposed on a discretionary,
piecemeal (i.e., adjudicative) basis.172 This approach would omit
from heightened scrutiny any exactions or conditions that are imposed through a broad, prospective (i.e., legislative) enactment.
The Koontz majority, perhaps unsurprisingly, did not focus on this
distinction between so-called legislative and adjudicative exactions.
Addressing the distinction was not strictly necessary to resolve the
case, and doing so would have likely made it impossible for Justice
Alito to hold together a majority.173 But a newly constituted majority (perhaps containing some of the Koontz dissenters) might
well choose the clarity and relative boundedness of this alternative
over the morass of uncertainty left behind in Koontz. Although the
distinction involves difﬁculties of its own (as we will see), some
sort of legislative/adjudicative distinction might keep Nollan and
Dolan from becoming the basis for completely open-ended heightened scrutiny.
1. The distinction’s traction. The distinction between legislative
and adjudicative state action is an appealing one for a number of
reasons. First, it is well established in both the case law and legal
171
Domains exempted from heightened exactions scrutiny would not, of course, be
exempted from all review. Rather, they would remain subject to due process and takings
challenges, as well as to challenges based on other constitutional provisions.
172
173

See 133 S Ct at 2608 (Kagan, J, dissenting).

Justice Thomas, part of the ﬁve-Justice Koontz majority, had previously suggested in
a dissent from a denial of certiorari that he viewed the legislative-adjudicative distinction
as constitutionally irrelevant. See Parking Ass’n of Georgia v City of Atlanta, 450 SE2d 200
(Ga 1994), cert denied, 515 US 1116, 1118 (1995) (Thomas, J, dissenting).
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commentary.174 In a well-functioning democratic system, extensive
political checks attend legislative enactments, and these arguably
make it less necessary (and indeed, inappropriate) to add intrusive
judicial checks. This is the usual explanation for why legislative
enactments not burdening fundamental rights or employing suspect classiﬁcations are afforded the most deferential standards of
judicial review.175 The same justiﬁcations for judicial deference
would seem to apply in the exactions context.176 In San Remo Hotel
v San Francisco, the California Supreme Court argued that
[a] city council that charged extortionate fees for all property development, unjustiﬁable by mitigation needs, would likely face widespread
and well-ﬁnanced opposition in the next election. Ad hoc individual
monetary exactions deserve special judicial scrutiny mainly because,
affecting fewer citizens and evading systematic assessment, they are
more likely to escape such political controls.177

As we have discussed, the line between broadly applicable, legislative acts and more individualized, adjudicative land use bargains
also coheres with what seems normatively problematic about some
exactions. Although legislative acts often emerge from bargains
between landowners (or coalitions of landowners) and government
actors, the result appears to be (at least at ﬁrst glance) a generally
applicable law that similarly situated landowners will be able to
enjoy (or under which they would chafe) equally. Such legislatively
enacted bargains do not implicate concerns with the rule of law
to the same degree as bargains that are available only to speciﬁcally
favored (or disfavored) landowners. To return to Fuller’s criteria,
exactions promulgated through a legislative process meet the requirements of generality, publicity, prospectivity, and congruence.
174

See note 38 and accompanying text.

175

See Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v State Bd. of Equalization, 239 US 441 (1915) (contrasting broadly applicable legislation, where reliance on political checks is appropriate,
with case-by-case, adjudicative decisions).
176
See, for example, McClung v City of Sumner, 548 F3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir 2008)
(arguing that the concerns raised by legislative exactions are better addressed through the
“ordinary restraints of the democratic process” (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting
San Remo Hotel v City and County of San Francisco, 27 Cal 4th 643, 671 (2002). Although
the Supreme Court expressly cited McClung’s refusal to extend exactions scrutiny to monetary exactions with disapproval in Koontz, see 133 S Ct 2586, at 2594, the Ninth Circuit’s
decision was also grounded in its distinction between legislative and adjudicative exactions.
Because the Supreme Court did not address the adjudicative/legislative distinction in
Koontz, the latter ground for the McClung holding appears to remain intact after Koontz.
177

San Remo Hotel L.P. v San Francisco, 27 Cal 4th 643, 671 (2002).
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And, as long as the law is not amended too frequently, they may
satisfy the requirement of stability as well.
More pragmatically, drawing the line between legislative and
adjudicative exactions would successfully immunize taxes, broadly
applicable fees, and many aspects of zoning from heightened scrutiny. Thus, if the distinction is judicially administrable, it could
help stave off the concern that Koontz has so expanded the exactions doctrine that every land-related decision has become susceptible to heightened judicial scrutiny. And it would do so in a
manner broadly consistent with the decided cases to date.178
2. Caveats and complications. There are some problems with the
legislative/adjudicative distinction, however. Perhaps most importantly, the boundary between the categories of legislative and adjudicative is not nearly as clear-cut in the local government arena
as it may be in other contexts.179 It is far from clear on the facts
of Koontz itself, for example, whether the exaction in that case was
legislative or ad hoc in character.180 The ﬂuidity between the categories may spark concerns about gamesmanship by local governments.
Consider the typical zoning code, which most people would
treat as a legislative enactment. In the usual Euclidean zoning law,
the kind at work in virtually every community in the United States,
the municipality divides its land up into various zones. These can
vary in number, from as few as three or four to well over a hundred.
Within each zone, certain uses are permitted as of right, certain
uses are prohibited, and others are permitted with special approval,
provided certain conditions are met.
In one sense, the zoning law operates through generally applicable provisions: all those who fall within the same zoning category
are subject to the same regulations. But the higher the number of
zones, the more that uniformity claim breaks down. (Imagine a
city with a different zoning classiﬁcation for each parcel.) And, of
178
Arguably, it is not fully consistent with Nollan, which seemed to involve a policy of
requiring lateral easements from all beachfront owners in a particular area. See 483 US
at 829. However, the facts in Nollan are susceptible to an interpretation in which the
exaction in that case is individualized, notwithstanding some degree of standardization
across property owners. Certainly this is the way the case was characterized by the Court
in Lingle. See 544 US at 546 (“Both Nollan and Dolan involved Fifth Amendment takings
challenges to adjudicative land-use exactions[.]”) .
179
See Carol M. Rose, New Models for Local Land Use Decisions, 79 Nw U L Rev 1155,
1158–59 (1985).
180

See note 168.
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course, along the boundaries between zones, the lawmaker has to
make highly individualized judgment calls about which individual
parcels to include within which classiﬁcation in a way that puts
enormous pressure on the distinction between legislation and adjudication.
Even setting aside the problem of placing parcels into one or
another of the possible zoning classiﬁcations, bargaining and discretion are built into most zoning and land use laws. Consider the
three categories of bargains we introduced above in Part II:
Past bargains. The complexity of zoning laws makes them almost inﬁnitely customizable. During a comprehensive rewriting
of a zoning law, property owners can lobby lawmakers to place
their parcel in one zone or another. They can also lobby lawmakers
to include some borderline use in the category in which their land
is ultimately placed. A landowner may lose the ﬁght to have her
property designated as commercial but convince zoning ofﬁcials
to include convenience stores as a conditional use in a high-density
residential zone. Neighbors may insist that convenience stores in
residential neighborhoods operate under strict limits on size and
business hours. The negotiations can go on and on. In the end,
they will be memorialized in generally applicable packages of beneﬁts and burdens.
Despite the messiness and complexity of zoning code writing,
it arguably still makes sense to place these past bargains in the
legislative box. After all, the bargains built into the code are in
some sense prospectively available to all similarly situated landowners. The mere fact that a particular zoning provision might
have been crafted through a process of individualized horse trading
is not so different from the way legislation is written in other
areas. Rather than ﬁxating on the fact of past horse trading, a
concern with the rule of law would seem to argue in favor of
considering the substance of zoning provisions on their own terms.
That is, instead of asking whether a zoning provision is based on
past bargaining, the question would be whether the lines it draws
are unfair or arbitrary or leave excessive room for administrative
discretion. These are questions that courts have typically (at least
in recent years) answered by applying the most deferential standards of review.181
181
See, for example, Hernandez v City of Hanford, 159 P3d 33 (Cal 2007) (applying
rational basis review in assessing an equal protection challenge to a zoning provision that
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Embedded bargains. Embedded bargains are pervasive in zoning codes. As long as the conditions they impose are deﬁned with
sufﬁcient precision, these need not present too much of a problem
for the legislative/adjudicative distinction. Like past bargains embedded in existing law, formulaic trade-offs that are available on
equal terms to all similarly situated landowners do not present the
favoritism and rule-of-law concerns that seem to be the most plausible justiﬁcations for heightened exactions scrutiny.
Some embedded bargains, however, include conditions that
place a great deal of discretion in the hands of land use regulators.
The zoning code for the city of Puyallup, Washington, for example, is not unusual in specifying that, in considering an application for any conditional use, “[t]he hearing examiner shall have
the authority to impose conditions and safeguards as he/she deems
necessary to protect and enhance the health, safety and welfare of
the surrounding area.”182 Although formally embodied in a legislative work product, such a scheme clearly contemplates caseby-case, ad hoc judgments.183
In contrast, incentive zoning normally operates through schedules of the burdens the developer must undertake in exchange for
the speciﬁed regulatory relief. The available regulatory beneﬁts—
and their “prices”—are typically spelled out in advance in a great
deal of detail and publicly available to all prospective developers
on equal terms. For example, under Seattle’s incentive zoning
scheme, developers can exceed height restrictions by a speciﬁed
amount if their building is LEED certiﬁed and they pay a certain
amount of money per additional square foot into an affordable
housing fund.184
prohibited stand-alone furniture stores outside of the downtown commercial district while
allowing the sale of furniture in large department stores in those areas).
182

Puyallup Municipal Code, 20.80.015.

183

Interestingly, the code goes on to say that “[n]o conditional use permit shall require
as a condition the dedication of land for any purpose not reasonably related to the use of
property for which the conditional use permit is requested, nor posting of a bond to
guarantee installation of public improvements not reasonably related to the use of property
for which the conditional use permit is requested.” Id. In effect, it incorporates a modiﬁed
exactions analysis into the code itself in an attempt to structure the discretion of decision
makers in tacking customized conditions onto embedded bargains. In so doing, it seems
to invite a kind of means-ends scrutiny by a court tasked with evaluating the legality (under
the municipal code) of a particular condition that a hearing examiner attaches to a conditional use permit. This approach is consistent with the idea that the need for robust
review increases as discretion grows.
184
See Seattle Planning Commission, Incentive Zoning in Seattle, 3 (2007), online at
http://www.seattle.gov/planningcommission/docs/SPC_IncZon.pdf.
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Where embedded bargains put broad discretion in the hands of
regulators, and where regulators use that discretion to impose oneoff exactions on landowners on a case-by-case basis, the mere fact
that they do so pursuant to the language of a zoning code would
not justify treating their impositions as “legislative.” Particularly
in the state courts, judges have shown a willingness to scrutinize
legislative enactments that place unbridled discretion in the hands
of land use administrators.185 But where the embedded bargains
employ publicly available terms that are spelled out in detail and
broadly available—as in incentive zoning—the scheme seems far
more legislative in nature and the case for judicial scrutiny is
weaker.186
Hypothetical bargains. Finally, hypothetical bargains reﬂect
the reality that land use decision making often occurs through
piecemeal modiﬁcation of the zoning law. Even inchoate or unsuccessful efforts by landowners to revise the mix of burdens and
beneﬁts embodied in an existing zoning code present the same
opportunities for favoritism and corruption that are present in the
classic exactions cases. To be sure, if the negotiations break down
because of a landowner’s objection to burdens the municipality
proposes to write into the modiﬁed zoning law itself (burdens that
would therefore be generally applicable to all similarly situated
landowners), the adjudicative/legislative distinction would counsel
against treating the hypothetical bargain as an exaction that calls
for heightened scrutiny. But where a local government declines
to modify the zoning code because of an owner’s refusal to accede
to the municipality’s demands that the owner accept some customized burden, the refusal to rezone looks structurally identical
185
See, for example, Anderson v City of Issaquah, 851 P2d 744 (Wash App 1993) (ﬁnding
a municipal regulation of aesthetic standards to be void for vagueness); Kosalka v Town of
Georgetown, 752 A2d 183, 187 (Maine 2000) (holding that a regulation that is “totally
lacking in cognizable, quantitative standards . . . violate[s] the due process clause.”).
186
Scholars have pointed to the potential for abuse in incentive zoning, sometimes noting
its structural similarity to bribery. See Eagle, Koontz in the Mansion at *12–13, *21–23
(cited in note 4) (citing Jerold Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? 39
Wash U J Urb & Contemp L 3 (1991)); see also Nestor M. Davidson, Values and Value
Creation in Public-Private Transactions, 94 Iowa L Rev 937, 954 n 56 (2009) (describing
but not endorsing the position that “‘selling’ regulatory privileges in exchange for public
beneﬁts” may create “skewed regulatory priorities and the potential for outright corruption”). To the extent that critics think that the generality and transparency of incentive
zoning are insufﬁcient safeguards to justify deferential rational-basis review, the question
arises whether their distrust of incentive zoning reﬂects a broader distrust of land use
regulation more generally and a desire to see heightened judicial scrutiny of land use
regulation across the board.
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to the exaction at issue in Koontz. Heightened exactions scrutiny
for individualized hypothetical deals would operate almost like a
penalty on (attempted) contract zoning.
Not all states treat piecemeal zoning modiﬁcations as legitimate
legislative acts. Some, such as Maryland, apply a kind of heightened scrutiny to such changes under the so-called “change-mistake” doctrine. Under that doctrine, piecemeal zoning changes, as
opposed to comprehensive rezonings, must be justiﬁed as necessary to either ﬁx a mistake in the original code or to respond to
some change in circumstances since the code was comprehensively
(re)written.187 Applying heightened exactions scrutiny to some
failed negotiations over zoning amendments would seem to push
municipalities in the direction of states like Maryland. Indeed, in
states where piecemeal rezoning is discouraged by doctrines like
the change-mistake rule, the category of hypothetical bargains may
largely disappear.
b. everything but taxes and fees
There is another way that the Court could keep its commitment
to elevated scrutiny for most exactions without endangering taxes
and fees. It could construct a test that effectively immunizes from
heightened scrutiny only conditional burdens that fall within Cell
IV of Figure 4: those that use a formulaic schedule to impose
purely monetary burdens on landowners. To trigger heightened
scrutiny, then, a landowner could show either that the government
was engaging in an individualized deal with her (involving any sort
of concession) or that it was requiring some in-kind concession
(whether through a legislative or adjudicative process).
Such an approach would not exempt the sorts of Cell III legislative enactments at issue in Parking Association of Georgia v City
of Atlanta188—a city ordinance that required surface parking lot
owners to provide a speciﬁed quantum of landscaping.189 It would,
187

See Clayman v Prince George’s County, 292 A2d 689 (Md 1972).

188

450 SE2d 200 (Ga 1994), cert denied, 515 US 1116 (1995).

189

It is possible, however, that such burdens might be deemed insufﬁcient to trigger
Nollan/Dolan analysis for another reason: that they do not amount to takings on their own.
While it is true that the ordinance in Parking Association of Georgia required physically
placing one tree for every eight parking spaces, it would seem that landscaping requirements, including the placement of privately owned trees, would be no different from the
requirement of a smoke alarm that the Loretto Court suggested would not be a taking.
See Loretto, 458 US at 440.
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however, exempt property taxes, standardized permitting fees, and
so on. This would help to address some of the concerns that the
Koontz decision introduced. But what should remain problematic
from the Court’s perspective is the extension of scrutiny into the
Cell III box. Virtually all of zoning law resides there (to the extent
it is not captured in Cell I). Heightened scrutiny applied to everything but taxes would upend the generally deferential treatment
that land use controls receive, unless it were coupled with some
other boundary principle. The Court resisted such an open-ended
extension of heightened scrutiny in Del Monte Dunes.190
Expanding heightened scrutiny to reach in-kind regulatory burdens that are legislatively applied would also have the interesting
consequence of encouraging price schedules to stand in for contextualized, qualitative evaluations and in-kind adjustments. Thus,
if a side-yard requirement would receive heightened scrutiny under this approach (because it conditions permission to build on
leaving an area unbuilt, albeit legislatively), a local government
could instead put a price on the right to build closer to the lot
line. This could effectively make zoning more alienable by replacing property rules with liability rules—a result many law and
economics scholars would ﬁnd attractive, but that others might
view with concern.191 By extending heightened scrutiny so deeply
into the heartland of land use, the Court could prompt changes—
perhaps unintended ones—in the way that land use control is
carried out.
c. other limits
The Court need not approach each of our cells in Figure 4 as
an all-or-nothing proposition, of course. There are any number
of ways that the spectrums of concessions and interactions could
be divided up, and features other than the ones emphasized in the
ﬁgure—between speciﬁc assets and general obligations, and between individualized and particularized bargains—could play a
role in marking out the exactions that would trigger Nollan/Dolan
scrutiny.
1. Burden sorting. We have already suggested one way of iden190

526 US 687, 702 (1999).
For an argument in support of the extensive use of development taxes instead of land
use regulation, see Stewart E. Sterk, Exploring Taxation as a Substitute for Overregulation
in the Development Process, 78 Brooklyn L Rev 417 (2013).
191
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tifying those concessions that will trigger heightened scrutiny: the
existence of a burden that would constitute a taking on its own.
It is unclear how the Court will ultimately square its claim in
Koontz that some general monetary obligations are Loretto takings
with the rest of takings jurisprudence. However, it is possible that
some category of regulatory actions and ﬁnancial obligations will
be safeguarded against heightened scrutiny on the grounds that
they would not constitute takings on their own. Although the
Court seems to have doomed itself (and lower courts) to struggle
with which land-related ﬁnancial obligations will now constitute
Loretto takings, it is still possible for it to apply this principle of
a “taking on its own” to exempt from heightened scrutiny regulatory exactions that do not rise to the level of permanent physical
occupations.
Setbacks, landscaping requirements, and all manner of ordinary
zoning tools (such as conditional use permitting requirements)
could be kept clear of the Nollan/Dolan framework through this
expedient alone, even without drawing a distinction between legislative and adjudicative acts. This restriction on eligible burdens
could also be combined with the exemption of formulaic monetary
impositions (the Cell IV cases). In combination, these approaches
would salvage most of what the Court likely wishes to protect
from heightened scrutiny, while allowing it to keep Nollan, Dolan,
and Koontz in place.
There are other possible ways to slice and dice the universe of
concessions. Requirements to spend money could be distinguished
from payments directly to the government.192 Expenditures to
bring one’s own property into compliance with particular requirements could be distinguished from off-site expenditures. Concessions that reduce the value of one’s property without beneﬁting
identiﬁable people directly (such as by placing certain areas under
a conservation easement) could be distinguished from concessions
that are undertaken for the beneﬁt of speciﬁc neighbors or third
parties. All such alternatives must be assessed with an eye to the
impact on administrability, the collateral effects on takings doctrine more generally, and the degree of ﬁt with whatever normative
goals are supposed to be served by heightening scrutiny in the
exactions area.
192
See Justin R. Pidot, Fees, Expenditures, and the Takings Clause (working paper 2013),
online at http://ssrn.com/abstractp2298307.
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2. Multiple-choice tests. The practical reach of exactions scrutiny
could also be limited through the treatment of multiple-option
governmental offers. Koontz itself involved a landowner who could
develop his parcel if he did enough to mitigate the effects on the
wetlands. The District gave him at least two choices that it considered sufﬁcient: cutting back the amount of developed land to
one acre (that is, placing a larger amount under a conservation
easement than he had initially contemplated), or providing funds
necessary to carry out wetlands mitigation on another parcel. The
Court found this to be a potentially extortionate choice set. Although Justice Alito suggested that the exaction would pass muster
if even one of the alternatives were acceptable, this is not how his
analysis played out. Because the monetary exaction was offered as
an alternative to giving up the use of a greater proportion of the
parcel, the majority opinion framed the monetary imposition as a
charge for getting to use more of the parcel, which in its view
collapsed the District’s multiple-choice offering to a single extortionate demand.
In fact, the Court appears to be saying that, if money is offered
as an alternative way to fulﬁll the landowner’s obligation, all other
choices will be viewed as tainted. The constitutional hook would
be that the demand for money, if viewed in isolation, counts as a
per se taking (although this had never been the law before Koontz).
If so, the monetary choice might seem to dangle before the landowner the possibility of reducing regulatory burdens (including
the burdens of the other available alternatives offered to the landowner) by giving up the right to just compensation for what in
the Koontz majority’s view amounts to a per se taking (i.e., the
money itself ). As actually carried out in Koontz, then, the addition
of alternatives does nothing to avoid heightened scrutiny—as long
as one of the choices is monetary in nature. On the contrary,
adding a monetary choice seemingly subjects the entire enterprise
to Nollan/Dolan analysis.
There are other ways the analysis could have proceeded, however. If Justice Alito had taken seriously his point about any valid
alternative validating the exaction, then the ability of Koontz to
glean viable economic use from his property without being required to cede anything that remotely resembled a per se taking
should have been sufﬁcient to keep the negotiation out of the
realm of Nollan and Dolan scrutiny. Yet it is easy enough to see
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why the Koontz majority proceeded as it did. The alternative that
allowed development of a portion of the property without ceding
anything that would count as a taking on its own simply became,
in the Court’s mind, part of the baseline against which a new
bargain—this one involving money—was offered. And the same
will always be true whenever money is allowed to stand in for
other regulatory alternatives—even one that is presented as another conditional option.
But what if the governmental entity does not offer a monetary
alternative at all, and also does not propose a physical taking?
Suppose, to take the facts of Koontz, that the owner were simply
told that he could develop one acre of his land if he placed another
portion of the parcel under a conservation easement, or allowed
it to be downzoned to a less intensive development classiﬁcation.
Would this constrained choice set avoid triggering heightened
scrutiny? Seemingly yes, at least if the Koontz majority meant to
retain the “taking on its own” requirement. What is being asked
in exchange for development rights is the sort of concession that
would not count as a taking under Loretto, nor under Lucas or Penn
Central. This analysis suggests that by removing options, heightened scrutiny may be dodged, and by adding them, it may be
triggered. Such a result might not seem surprising in the context
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. After all, the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions is puzzling precisely because it
frowns on governments adding, rather than removing, choices.
Is there a way to structure a menu of choices so that it reduces
rather than exacerbates the normative concerns behind exactions?
One possibility might involve offering landowners a choice between a fee generated by a formula or schedule and an individualized in-kind regulatory concession. The presence of the former,
offered as a take-it-or-leave-it offer available on equal terms to
all, could address worries about the rule of law and horizontal
inequity, while the latter might allow mutually beneﬁcial adjustments to be made from that baseline.
An obvious objection would be that the monetary schedule
might be set artiﬁcially high, so that no one would elect it. All
the real action would then occur within the individualized regulatory deals. But if this were so, then the monetary schedule would
not actually serve the sort of illegitimate leveraging purpose that
troubled the Koontz Court. An option that no one actually chooses
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(and cannot be forced to choose) cannot plausibly constitute a
form of extortion. It is true, however, that less powerful developers
might ﬁnd themselves limited to the monetary schedule, while the
government offered favored developers lighter regulatory alternatives. Some of the regulatory alternatives offered by the government might also be problematically burdensome in their own
right, even if they were insufﬁcient to amount to takings on their
own. The existence of a ﬁxed menu of choices would not by itself
ensure perfect equity or safeguard rule-of-law values. But it would
be possible to reinterpret the signiﬁcance of multiple alternatives
in a manner that is more conducive to the efforts of local governments to arrive at alternatives that offset development impacts
in the least costly manner.
d. scrutiny all around
The impetus for our effort to craft a boundary principle for
Nollan/Dolan analysis has been the need to maintain the two ﬁxed
points created by past takings cases: deferential review of most
land use regulations and the carve-out of heightened judicial scrutiny for certain “exactions.” If, however, we were liberated from
these two ﬁxed points, the pressure to precisely deﬁne the domain
of exactions scrutiny would diminish. In that situation, what direction should the law take? It is worth thinking about two very
different scenarios. In the ﬁrst, taken up in this section, courts
would jettison the long-standing deference afforded to land use
regulation since Euclid. Instead of deferring, courts would employ
something like heightened exactions scrutiny to all land use regulations. This would be a kind of Lochnerism, but one reserved
for the context of land use law. In the second, taken up in Section
E, courts would broaden the domain of Euclid deference to exactions, abandoning the island of heightened scrutiny it has created
under Nollan and Dolan.
It would certainly be (conceptually) possible to subject all or
most land use controls to heightened scrutiny. The disadvantages
of this approach are obvious. Although many land use regulations
would withstand judicial scrutiny, the costs of adjudicating the
legitimacy of those regulations would be enormous. Small local
governments are particularly poorly situated to bear those costs.
Rather than risk being hauled into court, local governments would
be more likely to simply scale back their regulation. This might
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superﬁcially seem like a desirable outcome for a certain brand of
naive libertarianism. But it would have the perverse effect of depriving local governments of their principal tools for protecting
landowners against threats to the use and enjoyment of their property. Oregon’s unhappy experience with Measure 37 suggests that,
once they confront the unpredictability of unregulated land use,
owners quickly come to realize the mutually protective value of
at least some land use regulation.193
On the other hand, enhanced judicial scrutiny of land use regulation would have some silver linings. Although zoning is a crucial
tool for protecting owners from the unpredictability of neighboring land uses, it is also a vehicle by which local governments
give the force of law to those owners’ prejudices and narrowly
framed self-interest. From its inception, the story of zoning has
been as much about exclusion, free-riding, and sprawl as it has
been about the thoughtful coordination of conﬂicting land uses.
Key among the beneﬁts of extending the domain of heightened
judicial scrutiny in the domain of land use regulation would be
its ability to lay bare the thin justiﬁcations for many types of zoning
restrictions.
While it is interesting to consider the implications of such a
move, we view it as too unlikely to carry the day and too disruptive
of settled expectations to warrant a full exploration here. Nor is
it likely to be, all things considered, the most attractive or useful
tack for addressing problems like exclusionary zoning. Nonetheless, it is helpful to bear in mind the nature of the constraints the
Court faces as it seeks to avoid this outcome.
e. relocate exactions
An alternative to extending the reach of heightened exactions
scrutiny would be to give up on the exactions project, at least as
understood as part of takings jurisprudence. It would be possible
to revert to rational basis style means-ends review for all land use
controls, including those that are packaged into bargains or that
involve concessions that would otherwise be takings. This suggestion is less radical than it appears. The Supreme Court’s exactions cases are of relatively recent vintage. And reverting to
deferential review as a matter of federal constitutional law would
193

See Berger, 78 Fordham L Rev at 1281 (cited in note 144).
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not mean abandoning all checks on governmental power. Takings
analysis under Penn Central, Lucas, and Loretto would provide a
continuing avenue for landowners seeking relief from the most
onerous regulatory burdens. In addition, landowners would be able
to seek judicial review of arbitrary and irrational regulation
through the Due Process Clause. Further, any of a number of
special purpose state-law doctrines constrain bargaining in various
ways to protect landowners and third parties. We will discuss these
last two options in turn.
1. The Due Process Clause. Courts can already review local land
use bargains for basic fairness and rationality using the tools of
substantive due process, and they could continue to do so in the
absence of any federal exactions doctrine located within the Takings Clause.194 Relying on due process review to police improper
bargains would ﬁt better with the Court’s prior pronouncements
about the division of labor between the Takings Clause and the
Due Process Clause.195 As the Court made clear in Lingle, the
Takings Clause is focused on protecting owners from bearing excessive burdens. Scrutiny of the ﬁt between the public ends served
by a land use regulation and the means chosen is not a takings
question, but one of substantive due process.
This distinction between due process questions and takings
questions is not an empty formalism. The remedy for a violation
of the Takings Clause is payment of just compensation. The remedy for a violation of due process is invalidation of the government
action. This is because the wrong associated with the Takings
Clause is simply the failure to structure a legitimate government
194
Many of the claims that would be amenable to due process scrutiny could just as
easily be evaluated under an equal protection analysis. As we have already discussed, see
text accompanying notes 93–96, the means-end inquiry at work in the substantive due
process context closely resembles similar inquiries courts have used in both the due process
and public use contexts. That similarity is likely generated by a common normative foundation in rule-of-law concerns about the dangers of arbitrary government action. And the
fundamental exactions complaint in its most attractive form—that the government has
treated the landowner arbitrarily—is largely the same under both theories. For an examination of how equal protection analysis might even address concerns that are currently
treated as regulatory takings issues, see generally Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of
Equality in Takings, 102 Nw U L Rev 1 (2008).
195
We are not alone in making this suggestion. See, for example, Echeverria, Koontz:
The Very Worst at *26–28 (cited in note 4). Indeed, Mark Fenster has suggested that the
Court effectively adopted a substantive due process approach to exactions in Koontz, and
that the majority’s reliance on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine served to remove
exactions from the realm of takings law altogether. See Fenster, Substantive Due Process at
*13–14 (cited in note 4).
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action in a way that avoids putting an excessive burden on a particular property owner. This wrong is ﬁxed by the payment of
compensation. The wrong associated with a violation of substantive due process is more grave: a failure of the government to act
according to basic rationality or to act in pursuit of legitimate
ends.196 And so the remedy is to block the government action in
a more categorical way.
The rule-of-law harms that exactions doctrine seems designed
to capture—favoritism and corruption—are much closer in their
nature and seriousness to the harms encompassed by the Due
Process Clause than they are to those that form the subject of
protection against uncompensated takings. In recent years, Justice
Kennedy has championed a more vigorous use of rational basis
due process review to address problems ranging from “judicial
takings”197 to general obligations to pay money.198 He has also
connected due process concerns to the public use requirement
within takings law.199 Consistent with this approach, the Court
should consider extending meaningful due process review into the
domain of the kinds of adjudicative land use bargains we have been
discussing. Grounding this inquiry in due process would eliminate
the need for an anomalously heightened means-ends exactions
review within the takings doctrine. At the same time, focusing it
narrowly on the category of bargains most likely to provide opportunities for government favoritism and abuse would limit the
danger of an ever-expanding domain of heightened judicial scrutiny in the land use context.
We do not mean to suggest that moving the exactions inquiry
into the due process arena will automatically resolve all difﬁculties.
Appropriate doctrines must be crafted or adapted to achieve ruleof-law ends. Our discussion has suggested that this undertaking
will involve difﬁcult trade-offs between ﬂexibility and stability,
uniformity and customization. Whatever tests are crafted—and we
do not undertake to specify them here—will be imperfect and
196
See Eduardo M. Peñalver and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial Takings or Due Process?
97 Cornell L Rev 305, 323–24 (2012).
197
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v Fla Department of Environmental Protection, 130
S Ct 2592, 2614 (2010) (Kennedy, J, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
198
Eastern Enterprises v Apfel, 524 US 498, 446–50 (1998) (Kennedy, J, concurring in
the judgment and dissenting in part).
199

Kelo v City of New London, 545 US 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J, concurring).

5]

EXACTIONS CREEP

355

subject to criticism. But they should at least be addressed to the
right sort of inquiry. What makes grounding exactions doctrine
in the Takings Clause so problematic is that it requires piggybacking on a set of substantive doctrines that are asking an entirely
different question (whether burdens should be borne without compensation) than the one to which exactions concerns are most
plausibly addressed (has the government abused its power). Moving exactions doctrine into the Due Process Clause would produce
conceptual congruence between the doctrinal foundation and the
concerns that exactions generate. It would free the Court from
the futile and destructive task of attempting to shoehorn its worries
about government misbehavior into categories created to address
compensable (but otherwise proper) governmental burdens. And
it would reduce the risk that such shoehorning will (in the process)
distort both exactions and takings doctrine.
2. State law. Apart from federal due process review, it is important to remember that state courts have developed a number
of state-law doctrines to address the issues raised by bargaining
and discretion in the land use context. These include (1) restrictions on contract and spot zoning;200 (2) state law exactions doctrines;201 (3) limitations on the ability to engage in piecemeal rezonings, such as the change-mistake rule;202 and (4) standards of
due process review that exceed those imposed by federal constitutional norms.203 All of these doctrines work either to constrain
the sort of discretion necessary to get land use bargains off the
ground or to police those bargains once they are made.
An advantage of relying on state law is broader state court exposure to land use conﬂicts and more permissive standing doctrines in state courts that would permit a (potentially) all-encompassing approach to bargains. “Exactions” as a problem of federal
constitutional law seems concerned only with landowners being
200
See Little v Winborn, 518 NW2d 384, 387–89 (Iowa 1994) (scrutinizing spot zoning);
Dacy v Village of Ruidoso, 845 P2d 793, 796–98 (NM 1992) (discussing judicial scrutiny of
contract zoning).
201
See Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US 374, 389–91 (1994) (surveying state-law exactions
doctrines). Some state law limits on development conditions do not expressly use the term
“exaction” or may ﬁnd doctrinal footing outside the Takings Clause. See, for example,
Rosen v Village of Downers Grove, 167 NE2d 230 (Ill 1960).
202

See note 187 and accompanying text.
See, for example, Johnson v City of Peducah, 512 SW2d 514 (Ky 1974) (striking down
a local land use ordinance as violating Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution, which
prohibits “arbitrary” state action).
203
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exploited, and that is the pattern that exactions claims have invariably taken: a landowner challenges the conditions imposed on
her in exchange for development approval. But land use bargains
raise important questions of fairness to third parties not included
in the negotiations. Neighbors may have cause to challenge land
use bargains that exact too little from developers in exchange for
permission to develop land in ways that harm others. Having a
layer of federal protection that applies only to a subset of the
overall issue of improper bargains arguably impedes coherent state
law solutions.
Another advantage to leaving (more) exactions review to the
states is that state courts are well equipped to tailor solutions to
the ways in which deals are typically accomplished in the particular
jurisdiction. Most land use law is state law. State courts are far
more familiar with the dynamics of land use regulation in their
jurisdictions than federal courts can realistically hope to become.204
One concern of the Koontz dissent is that—if heightened review
extends too broadly—communications between landowners and
government will be inhibited. This is not necessarily a bad thing,
if we examine some of the strategic implications of placing one
party or the other into the position of making a take-it-or-leaveit offer.205 Changing the way lines of communication work can be
useful, but there is no reason to think that federal courts are best
able to ﬁne-tune these changes. Even if there is some best way to
reduce leverage, experimentation at the state level seems more
likely to arrive at it than occasional Supreme Court pronouncements.

204
See Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalism Dimension of Takings Jurisprudence, 114 Yale L J 203,
226–28 (2004) (discussing the difﬁculty that federal courts have in assessing land use laws
for constitutional validity and arguing that state courts are better situated to undertake that
role); Rick Hills, Bill Fischel on Koontz: Why Federalism Should Limit Enforcement of the Takings
Doctrine, Prawfsblawg, Aug 16, 2013, 12:50 pm, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/
2013/08/bill-ﬁschel-on-koontz-why-federalism-should-limit-enforcement-of-takings-doctrine
.html (making a case for using state law as the primary mechanism for policing exactions
and quoting Fischel for the point that a more localized perspective dominates “the view from
Olympus.”). See also Robert C. Ellickson, Federalism and Kelo: A Question for Richard Epstein,
44 Tulsa L Rev 751, 762 (2009) (maintaining that “state courts, not federal courts, should
be centrally responsible for limiting eminent domain abuses by state and local agencies”).
205
See, for example, Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L J 1027, 1049–50 (1995) (discussing the
bargaining advantages associated with take-it-or-leave-it offers).
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VI. Conclusion
In Nollan and Dolan, the Court started down a path that,
if followed beyond a certain point, cannot be reconciled with broad
judicial deference to garden-variety land use controls. When a
particular fact pattern is placed in the Nollan/Dolan box, it receives
astonishing treatment: the government must prove that the burdens it has imposed are logically related to and proportionate to
the costs of the permitted development. Applying this approach
to all of land use would mean that zoning and much else would
either disappear or become prohibitively expensive to administer.
This presumably would be unacceptable to the Court and to most
property owners. Yet Koontz heedlessly lurched toward this unwanted endpoint, knocking over barriers that it found logically
unconvincing, unaccountably conﬁdent that its exactions jurisprudence would obviously and automatically spare all “good” land
use regulations.
The result is a doctrinally disordered decision. It is entirely
possible, perhaps even likely, that some of the worst on-the-ground
impacts will be signiﬁcantly buffered. For example, Rick Hills has
suggested that the Koontz Court’s failure to specify damages offers
courts a viable “exit strategy.”206 Anemic remedies or procedural
blockades may keep many of the problems foreseen by the dissent
from coming about, or from taking their most catastrophic
206
See Rick Hills, Koontz’s Unintelligible Takings Rule: Can Remedial Equivocation Save
the Court from a Doctrinal Quagmire? Prawfsblawg, June 25, 2013, 3:41 pm, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/06/koontzs-unintelligible-takings-rule-can-remedialequivocation-make-up-for-an-incoherent-substantive-.html (“Koontz carefully preserves a
convenient albeit disingenuous ‘remedial’ exit strategy that should insure that the decision
is a dead letter.”). Hills focuses on the following line from the majority opinion: “Because
petitioner brought his claim pursuant to a state law cause of action, the Court has no
occasion to discuss what remedies might be available for a Nollan/Dolan unconstitutional
conditions violation either here or in other cases.” Koontz, 133 S Ct at 2597 (quoted in
Hills). If Hills’s prognosis is correct, Koontz might never cash out in a meaningful way
for landowners, echoing the outcomes in cases like Loretto and Brown. In Loretto, the
Supreme Court remanded on the question of just compensation and the New York Court
of Appeals upheld the power of the Commission on Cable Television to set the compensation rate. Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 NE2d 428 (NY 1983). This
rate had been set by the Commission at $1 as a general matter. See Loretto v Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 423 NE2d 320, 325 (NY 1981). In Brown, the Court held that
the transfer of interest from speciﬁc accounts could be a per se taking, but found that the
compensation due in the case at hand would be zero, as the owners of the principal did
not suffer any net loss. 538 US at 240. Expanding the range of exactions scrutiny, like
extending the scope of per se takings, may thus have the effect of pushing contextual
inquiries, such as those involving in-kind compensation, later in the analysis rather than
suppressing them altogether. The threat of litigation and uncertainty over remedies could
remain quite costly for local governments, however, at least in the short run.
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forms.207 Repeat-play developers may acquiesce with local governments in legally questionable but mutually beneﬁcial deals.208
In this sense, Koontz may turn out to be much ado about nothing.
But in another sense, Koontz embodies a tension that the Court
cannot ultimately avoid addressing—one over the best way to reconcile fundamentally inconsistent strands of property rights protection. We hope that by conveying something of this tension here,
we have added to an understanding of the contradictory dictates
of property protection itself—whether or not the Court manages
to address them in a satisfying way.

207
It is even possible that procedural and remedial developments will inform courts’
future understanding of the underlying exactions doctrine. See Fenster, Substantive Due
Process at *13–14 (cited in note 4) (reading into the Koontz Court’s remedial ambivalence
an understanding of exactions doctrine that would pull it out of the Takings Clause and
permit remedies like invalidation that ﬁt instead with substantive due process).
208
See Dana, 75 NC L Rev at 1286–99 (cited in note 37). Doctrines of standing play
a role here, including whether (and on what grounds) third parties such as neighbors are
allowed to challenge deals that affect their interests. See note 77.

